Application Resource Binding With Host Fingerprint Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing software protection strategies, including white-box cryptography and software licensing, fail to securely bind application resources to host devices, leaving them vulnerable to attacks and lacking flexibility in multi-host scenarios.
Innovation Solution
A method involving asymmetric key pairs and device fingerprinting is used to bind application resource files to host devices during installation and execution, ensuring secure usage by verifying signatures and hashes to ensure compatibility and authenticity.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If white-box cryptography is used to protect cryptographic operations, then cryptographic assets remain secure against white-box attacks, but the technology lacks generic device binding capability for non-mobile hosts
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extends device binding capability from mobile-only to universal multi-platform support (Windows, macOS, Linux, Unix). The host fingerprinting mechanism and asymmetric key pair implementation work across all these platforms, making the security solution universally applicable rather than mobile-specific.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces host fingerprinting as an intermediary mechanism that bridges the gap between cryptographic operations and device identification. The fingerprint acts as a mediator that binds cryptographic assets to specific hosts through verifiable host characteristics, enabling secure binding without requiring mobile-specific hardware.
2Reliability
If software licensing with license servers is used, then some protection is provided, but the system requires constant connection to license servers and has implementation costs
Solution Approach 1:
The patent performs binding actions during application installation rather than requiring ongoing license server verification. The host fingerprint is captured and asymmetric keys are generated upfront during installation, binding the application to the host before execution. This preliminary binding eliminates the need for continuous license server connections during operation.
Solution Approach 2:
The system becomes self-sufficient by generating its own asymmetric key pairs locally on each host without requiring external license server intervention. The application verifies its binding to the host using locally stored public keys and host fingerprints, making the system autonomous and eliminating dependency on license servers for verification.
3Adaptability or versatility
If application resource files are not bound to specific hosts, then the application can run on multiple hosts, but attackers can easily copy and transfer resources between hosts
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses asymmetric cryptography (public-private key pairs) to create a one-way binding relationship. The private key remains on the host to sign resource files, while the public key is used for verification. This asymmetric approach allows resource files to be verified on any host with the public key, maintaining multi-host capability while preventing unauthorized copying since the private key cannot be extracted from the signed resources.
Solution Approach 2:
The binding between application resources and host fingerprint occurs in advance during installation through digital signing. This preliminary binding embeds the host's identity into the resource files themselves, allowing the resources to be transported and executed on multiple hosts while maintaining their authenticated association with the original host, thus preventing unauthorized access.
Data Source
AI summary
A system and method for protecting an application resource file (RF) when a client uses an application on a host can include the steps by the application on the host of binding the RF to the host during execution of the application on the host by obtaining a device fingerprint of the host, verifying a signature by using the RF, the device fingerprint of the host, and a public key, where the signature was created during or at one of the following: a) an installation of the application at the host by signing the RF and the device fingerprint of the host using a private key corresponding to the public key; (b) an application provider before the installation of the application at the host; or (c) a client device; and where the method further uses the RF if a verification of the signature is successful.