ASIC Security Module for Autonomous Booting
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current secure boot mechanisms for desktop computers and embedded systems rely on untrusted RAM for key storage, lack flexible key hierarchies, and are vulnerable to physical attacks, such as cold boot attacks, which compromise the integrity and confidentiality of software and data.
Innovation Solution
An encryption system with a security module integrated into an ASIC for autonomous booting, featuring symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems, cryptographic hash functions, key exchange protocols, secure key storage, and a flexible key hierarchy, ensuring that key material remains encrypted outside the security module, with read-only memory for the first stage bootloader and encrypted storage for the operating system and applications.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If key material is stored in RAM for boot operations, then the boot process can proceed, but the system becomes vulnerable to physical attacks such as cold boot attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts key material from volatile RAM and stores it in a dedicated secure storage unit within the security module. This separation ensures that encryption keys are never present in plain text in RAM, eliminating the vulnerability to cold boot attacks while maintaining boot functionality.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a security module as an intermediary component between the CPU and storage systems. This module contains a secure storage unit that acts as a mediator for key management, providing cryptographic operations and key protection without exposing keys to the main system memory.
2Reliability
If a custom security module is implemented for trusted bootstrapping, then security and key storage are improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent combines multiple security functions including key storage, cryptographic operations, and trusted bootstrapping capabilities into a single integrated security module. This consolidation provides comprehensive security functionality while managing hardware complexity through functional integration.
3Device complexity
If encryption keys are stored outside dedicated storage in standard memory, then device complexity is reduced, but security is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies different storage qualities to different data types: standard memory is used for general data storage, while a dedicated secure storage unit within the security module is used specifically for key material. This localized security approach protects keys without complicating the overall storage architecture.
Data Source
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AI summary
In order to design an encryption system in such a way that an autonomous booting is permitted, wherein the data and codes are encrypted, and secured by digital signatures and/or message authentication codes (MAC) and therefore cannot be manipulated/replaced, based on an encryption system according to the preamble of claim 1, according to the invention, for autonomous booting of the operating system (OS), a security module (SM) is integrated in the ASIC, consisting of a symmetric cryptosystem (SK), an asymmetric cryptosystem, a module for the generation of cryptographic hash functions (KH), a module for the secure exchange of keys having key exchange protocols (SP) implemented in the hardware, a key memory (SS) for the secure storing of root keys (WS), which are protected by means of corresponding measures in the physical structures of the ASICs, and a key administration (SV) for the secure introduction of authenticated encrypted key packets, characterised in that the security module (SM) is connected to a central processing unit (ZVE) via a communications interface (KS1) and in that the central processing unit (ZVE) is connected to both at least one internal memory (IS) and one external memory (ES) as well as to at least one internal permanent memory (IP) and one external permanent memory (EP), in such a way that the operating system (OS) is loaded through a second-stage boot loader (SSB), and thereafter the operating system (OS) loads the applications, wherein the second-stage boot loader (SSB) is self-decrypted and loaded by a first-stage boot loader (FSB) and requires a public key (PUBOS) in order to verify the operating system (OS) and a symmetric key (KOS) in order to decrypt the operating system (OS).