Asymmetric Circuit Authentication Against Quantum Attacks

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional asymmetric authentication methods, such as RSA, are vulnerable to quantum computers, which can efficiently perform prime number factorization, rendering existing secure mechanisms ineffective against quantum computing threats.

Innovation Solution

The integration of encryption techniques where the public key of a public-private key pair is encrypted using a symmetric key, similar to a private key, and stored off-chip, allowing the integrated circuit to decrypt and authenticate data using the decrypted public key, thereby reducing vulnerability to quantum computers.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If conventional asymmetric authentication (RSA) is used, then authentication security is maintained against classical computers, but the system becomes vulnerable to quantum computer attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication securityVSAvoidquantum computer vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent changes the cryptographic parameters from classical asymmetric algorithms (RSA) to quantum-resistant symmetric encryption algorithms. By transitioning to symmetric encryption with appropriately sized keys (e.g., 256-bit AES), the system maintains security against both classical and quantum computers, as symmetric encryption's security scaling differs from asymmetric encryption when faced with quantum attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Solution Approach 2:

The patent substitutes the mathematical problem-based security mechanism of asymmetric encryption (which relies on hard mathematical problems like integer factorization) with a different cryptographic mechanism - symmetric encryption based on key secrecy. This replacement eliminates vulnerability to quantum algorithms like Shor's algorithm while maintaining authentication security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

2Object-affected harmful factors

If public keys are stored off-chip, then security against quantum attacks is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvequantum attack resistanceVSAvoidkey management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the cryptographic key storage from the integrated circuit itself and places it off-chip in secure external memory or key management infrastructure. This extraction allows the IC to use quantum-resistant symmetric encryption while keeping the key management complexity external to the device, reducing the burden on the IC's internal security architecture.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary key management system that handles the secure storage and management of symmetric keys off-chip. This intermediary layer manages the complexity of key protection, updates, and access control externally, allowing the IC to benefit from quantum-resistant encryption without bearing the full complexity burden.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS10776522B1Asymmetric protection of circuit designs
Publication Date: 2020.09.15 XILINX INC
  • US10776522B1 patent drawing
  • US10776522B1 patent drawing
  • US10776522B1 patent drawing

AI summary

Protecting circuit designs can include, in response to receiving a first encrypted public key, generating, using a hash circuit within the integrated circuit, a first hash of the first encrypted public key. The first hash can be compared with a second hash that was previously stored within a non-volatile memory of the integrated circuit. In response to determining that the first hash matches the second hash, the first encrypted public key is decrypted resulting in a first decrypted public key. A determination is made whether received configuration data for the device is authentic using the first decrypted public key.