Asymmetric Password Authentication Resilient to Pre-computation Attacks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing asymmetric password-based authentication and key sharing methods are vulnerable to pre-computation attacks and require multiple communication rounds, making them inefficient and insecure.
Innovation Solution
An asymmetric password-based authentication and key sharing method that generates a first hash key, a second hash key, and a random number exponent as a private salt using a public parameter and a password, allowing for one-round communication and resilience to pre-computation attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If asymmetric PAKE protocols use fixed parameters or public salts for one-way hash function values, then authentication can be performed efficiently, but the system becomes highly vulnerable to pre-computation attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The client performs preliminary actions by generating the one-way hash function value and encrypting it with the server's public key before sending it to the server. This preliminary encryption prevents the server from directly accessing or pre-computing hash values, thereby maintaining security while enabling efficient authentication.
Solution Approach 2:
The server's public key acts as an intermediary that protects the one-way hash function value during transmission and storage. By encrypting the hash value with the public key, the system prevents direct access to the hash value, blocking pre-computation attacks while maintaining authentication efficiency.
2Reliability
If TLS/SSL technology is used with server's public key for password authentication, then secure communication can be established, but the system becomes vulnerable to public key compromise and requires additional key management complexity
Solution Approach 1:
The invention extracts and removes the need for clients to possess or manage server public keys separately. The public key functionality is integrated into the authentication protocol itself, eliminating the need for separate key management while maintaining secure communication.
Solution Approach 2:
The server's public key serves multiple functions: it encrypts the one-way hash function value for secure transmission, enables the client to verify the server's identity, and establishes secure communication channels. This multi-functionality reduces the need for separate key management mechanisms.
3Ease of operation
If password is transmitted in clear plain text to server for verification, then authentication process is simple, but the password becomes exposed to server compromise and hacking
Solution Approach 1:
The invention transforms the password from clear plain text into a one-way hash function value before transmission. This parameter change (from plaintext to hashed form) maintains authentication simplicity while preventing password exposure, as the hashed value cannot be reverse-engineered to reveal the original password.
Solution Approach 2:
The one-way hash function acts as an intermediary that processes the password before transmission. Instead of sending the raw password, the system sends the hashed value, which serves as a secure representation that prevents direct password exposure while enabling verification.
Data Source
AI summary
The invention relates to an one-round password-based authentication and key sharing method with resilience to pre-computation attacks and with communication round efficiency, and the method includes: allowing a client to generate a first hash key, a second hash key, and a random number exponent that is a private salt by using a public parameter and a password and to register the PW-authentication value information including a commitment value generated by the first hash key, the second hash key, and the random number exponent in a server; allowing the client to generate the second hash key by using the password, to generate a client random number exponent, to generate a client temporary public key by using the second hash key and the client random number exponent, and to deliver the client temporary public key to the server; allowing the server to generate a server random number exponent, to generate a ciphertext of a server temporary public key by using the server random number exponent and the PW-authentication value information, and to deliver the ciphertext to the client; allowing the client to generate the first hash key by using the password, to decrypt the ciphertext, and to acquire the server temporary public key; allowing the client to generate the temporary common key by using the server temporary public key and the client random number exponent; and allowing the server to generate the temporary common key by using the client temporary public key and the server random number exponent.