Dynamic Auction Interface for Unmet Reserve Prices

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Solution Overview

Problem

Online auctions often fail to meet reserve prices due to lack of bidding activity, especially when only one bidder is involved, leading to unsuccessful sales and inefficiencies in online marketplaces.

Innovation Solution

A system and method that dynamically updates bidder interfaces and adjusts auction parameters, such as bid increments and ending times, to encourage bidders to meet reserve prices by providing notifications and suggested bids based on auction activity and bidder profiles, thereby enhancing engagement and increasing the likelihood of successful auctions without relying on seller bidding.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If the auction ends when the time expires without meeting reserve price, then the auction process is simple and fast, but the reserve price is not met and the sale fails

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvereserve price meetingVSAvoidauction structure
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The auction structure dynamically adapts based on bidding activity. When only one bidder is active and the reserve price is not met, the system automatically updates the bidder interface with notifications and suggested bids, transforming a static auction ending into a dynamic, responsive process that adjusts to participant engagement levels.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback mechanisms by monitoring bidding activity in real-time and providing notifications to bidders about reserve price status. This feedback loop allows the single bidder to understand the situation and take corrective action by placing additional bids to meet the reserve price.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Reliability

If seller bidding is used to meet reserve price, then the reserve price is guaranteed to be met, but ethical concerns and customer expectations are violated

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvereserve price meetingVSAvoidethical concerns
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system enables the bidder to self-correct the situation by providing them with information about the unmet reserve price and suggested bid amounts through updated interfaces. The bidder voluntarily places additional bids to meet the reserve price without external intervention or deception, maintaining ethical standards while achieving the reserve price goal.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Productivity

If the auction allows only one bidder to participate, then the auction process is simple, but the reserve price is unlikely to be met

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauction efficiencyVSAvoidreserve price meeting
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary analysis of bidding activity to identify situations with single bidders before the auction ends. By detecting these conditions early and updating the bidder interface with notifications and suggested bids, the system proactively prevents reserve price failures rather than reacting after the fact.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

4Reliability

If the bidder interface is updated with notifications about unmet reserve price, then the bidder is encouraged to meet reserve price, but the interface complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvereserve price meetingVSAvoidbidder interface
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The interface updates are applied locally and selectively only to bidders in specific situations (single bidder with unmet reserve price), rather than changing the entire interface for all users. This targeted approach provides necessary information to affected bidders while maintaining interface simplicity for other users.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Data Source

PatentUS10417697B2System and method for structuring an online auction when reserve price is not met
Publication Date: 2019.09.17 AUCTION COM
  • US10417697B2 patent drawing
  • US10417697B2 patent drawing
  • US10417697B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A system and method for structuring an online auction when a reserve price is not met are described. In an online auction, bidding activity is analyzed over a duration to determine whether there are multiple active bidders for the auction and whether the reserve price for the auction is met after a designated period of time. In response to making that determination, the bidder interface for a sole active bidder on the auction can be automatically updated to include a notification that the bid has not met the reserve price and an option to place a new bid on the item so that the auction is successful and does not end with no bids meeting the reserve.