Incentivized Auction Messaging System for Spam Reduction

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Solution Overview

Problem

Traditional messaging systems lack incentives for senders to deliver meaningful messages and recipients to read them, leading to spam issues, as couriers are incentivized to overdeliver and users rely on manual filters that often misidentify relevant messages as spam.

Innovation Solution

An incentivized auction-style messaging system where senders bid for their messages to be read, and recipients can earn incentives for acknowledging messages, using an incentivization engine and auction service to promote relevant communication and discourage spam by offering rewards for engagement.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Quantity of substance

If traditional courier systems charge postage fees, then delivery cost is covered, but couriers are incentivized to overdeliver and spam messages increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemessage delivery volumeVSAvoidspam messaging
Core Design Contradiction:
Quantity of substanceVSObject-generated harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of incentivizing couriers to deliver more messages through postage fees, the system inverts the incentive structure by charging senders per message delivered and rewarding recipients for reading messages. This reverses the traditional model where the courier is incentivized to overdeliver, and instead makes the sender responsible for message value while the recipient controls engagement.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #13The other way round (Inversion)

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes the economic parameters of message delivery by introducing dynamic pricing where senders bid for message delivery and recipients bid for incentive rewards. This transforms the fixed postage fee model into a flexible auction-based system where message delivery costs and recipient incentives are determined by market conditions and message value.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Ease of operation

If no fees are charged for messaging, then ease of communication is maintained, but spam messaging increases and meaningful messages are lost

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemessaging accessibilityVSAvoidmeaningful messages filtered as spam
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The system implements feedback loops where recipient engagement behavior (reading, clicking, responding) generates data that feeds back into the auction mechanism. This feedback allows the system to learn which messages are valuable and adjust incentive allocations accordingly, improving message quality over time while maintaining accessibility through the auction-based incentive model rather than blocking messages.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary auction service that mediates between senders and recipients. This intermediary manages the incentive auctions, allocates rewards based on message engagement, and filters spam through the economic mechanism rather than manual filtering, preserving meaningful messages while reducing spam without requiring users to manually configure filters.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Object-affected harmful factors

If manual spam filters are implemented, then spam detection capability is provided, but false positive results increase and meaningful messages are blocked

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespam detectionVSAvoidmessage delivery accuracy
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system converts the harmful effect of spam into a beneficial economic mechanism. Instead of trying to detect and block spam through filters, the auction-based incentive system makes spam economically unviable by requiring senders to bid for message delivery and rewarding only engaged recipients. Spam messages naturally fail to generate sufficient incentive value, eliminating the need for unreliable manual filtering.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

4Manufacturing precision

If senders are required to bid for message delivery, then message quality is improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemessage relevance qualityVSAvoidauction system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Manufacturing precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The auction system operates as a self-service mechanism where senders automatically bid for message delivery based on their confidence in message value, and recipients automatically bid for incentive rewards based on their engagement interest. The system handles auction matching, incentive allocation, and spam filtering automatically without requiring manual intervention, reducing the perceived complexity for users while maintaining high message quality through economic incentives.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS10282760B2Incentivized auction style messaging
Publication Date: 2019.05.07 BYRNE MICHAEL COLLINS
  • US10282760B2 patent drawing
  • US10282760B2 patent drawing
  • US10282760B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A system for incentivization of communications, comprising an incentivization engine and an auction service, and a method for using such a system for providing incentivization of user communications and user competition for incentives.