Automated Testing System for Hardware Software Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
The architecture of hardware and software systems ensures functional safety but often fails to guarantee informational security, requiring additional measures that may not consider the interests of authorized users or requirements of functional safety.
Innovation Solution
An automated testing system that uses a threat model to compare with a usage model, identifying vulnerable components that could compromise informational security, and selects hardware and software components to limit unauthorized use and threat realization while meeting functional safety requirements.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If additional security means are added to address informational security, then informational security is improved, but device complexity and potential conflict with functional safety requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary analysis by comparing the threat model with the usage model during the design phase, identifying potential security vulnerabilities before the system is deployed. This allows security measures to be integrated into the architecture from the beginning rather than added as afterthoughts, reducing overall system complexity while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
The comparison between threat model and usage model acts as an intermediary analysis layer that identifies security issues without requiring direct implementation of complex security mechanisms. This intermediary comparison reveals vulnerabilities that can then be addressed through targeted, simplified security measures rather than comprehensive complex systems.
2Reliability
If additional security means are added to address informational security, then informational security is improved, but the interests of authorized users and functional safety requirements may be compromised
Solution Approach 1:
By performing the threat-model-versus-usage-model comparison during the design phase, the system identifies security vulnerabilities before finalizing the architecture. This allows security requirements to be balanced against user interests and functional safety requirements from the outset, ensuring all three aspects are considered together rather than security being added later at the expense of other requirements.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the parameter of analysis by introducing a formal comparison between threat models and usage models. This analytical approach allows for quantitative or qualitative assessment of security vulnerabilities while simultaneously evaluating their impact on user interests and functional safety, enabling optimized balance among competing requirements.
3Measurement precision
If comprehensive security testing is performed to detect all vulnerabilities, then informational security detection capability is improved, but testing time and system complexity increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system extracts and compares only the essential elements between the threat model and usage model, focusing on specific vulnerability patterns rather than performing exhaustive testing of all system components. This selective extraction of critical security issues enables efficient identification of the most important vulnerabilities without requiring comprehensive testing of every possible attack vector.
Solution Approach 2:
The comparison approach performs a targeted analysis that may identify more vulnerabilities than strictly necessary (excessive action), but does so through an efficient automated process that compensates for the increased scope. Alternatively, it performs partial testing focused on the most critical threat scenarios, achieving sufficient detection capability without exhaustive coverage.
Data Source
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AI summary
Disclosed herein are methods and systems for automated testing of hardware and software systems. An exemplary method comprises receiving a formalized architecture description describing an architecture of a system being designed, receiving a formalized threat description describing threats to systems similar to the system being designed, building, by a processor, a use model based on the formalized description, building, by a processor, a threat model based on the formalized threat description, determining, by a processor, kinds of use of the system by comparing the threat model to the use model and determining, by a processor, components of the system based on the kinds of use.