Autonomous Vehicle Safety Architecture With Redundant Event Voting
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Solution Overview
Problem
Autonomous vehicle systems face challenges due to their complex and costly automated systems, requiring significant expertise and proprietary technologies, which can be cost-prohibitive for mainstream consumer vehicles. Additionally, these systems are prone to failures, especially in critical safety-critical systems, leading to potential operational failures and safety risks.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of a distributed sensor system architecture with a safety architecture that monitors outputs of linked components to detect failures. This architecture allows for modular design with multiple sensor processing nodes and a real-time data bus, enabling component redundancy and fault-tolerant operations. Safety managers compare outputs from multiple components to identify failures and adapt operations to continue safe system functionality despite component failures.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Extent of automation
If a centralized autonomous vehicle system is implemented, then automation functionality is achieved, but system reliability deteriorates due to susceptibility to cascading failures and lockup
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the autonomous vehicle system into multiple independent processing nodes (first node, second node, third node) that operate in parallel. Each node independently processes sensor data and generates control commands, eliminating the single point of failure in centralized systems. The nodes are organized into separate teams (first team, second team) with distinct processing paths, ensuring that failures in one node do not cascade to others.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements predetermined failover mechanisms where backup nodes are ready to take over immediately upon detecting a failure. The patent establishes voting protocols and consensus algorithms that pre-define how the system responds to failures, cushioning against the impact of node failures before they can cause system-wide lockup or shutdown.
2Extent of automation
If multiple automated systems and sensors are integrated, then autonomous functionality is enhanced, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the complex autonomous vehicle system into modular nodes, each responsible for specific processing tasks. This modular architecture allows the system to handle multiple sensors and automated functions while maintaining manageable complexity through clear separation of responsibilities and standardized inter-node communication protocols.
3Adaptability or versatility
If proprietary autonomous vehicle systems are developed in-house, then company competencies are built, but development costs increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent describes a universal platform architecture where the multi-node system can be deployed across different vehicle types and applications. The standardized node interfaces and communication protocols allow the same core technology to serve multiple functions and be adapted to various autonomous vehicle implementations, reducing per-project development costs while maintaining core competencies.
Data Source
AI summary
In embodiments of an autonomous vehicle platform and safety architecture, safety managers of a safety-critical system monitor outputs of linked components of the safety-critical system. The linked components comprise at least three components, each of which is configured to produce output indicative of a same event independent from the other linked components by using different input information than the other linked components. The safety managers also compare the outputs of the linked components to determine whether each output indicates the occurrence of a same event. When the output of one linked component does not indicate the occurrence of an event that is indicated by the outputs of the other linked components, the safety managers identify the one linked component as having failed. Based on this, the outputs of the other linked components are used to carry out operations of the safety-critical system without using the output of the failed component.