Autonomous Vehicle Certificate Management Using Tiered Lifespans
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing autonomous vehicle systems face challenges in efficiently managing and revoking certificates due to the large volume of automatically generated certificates, which are difficult to maintain for revocation, especially in large fleets, and there is a need for secure device registration and certificate management to protect against cyber threats.
Innovation Solution
A system is implemented that uses unique IDs and lifespans for certificates, with a global revocation list, and secure device registration processes, including partitioning unique IDs into subparts like VIN, Device_Type, and Device_Identifier, and managing certificates with specific time expirations to ensure secure communication and authentication.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Extent of automation
If certificates are automatically generated for large fleets of autonomous vehicles, then device registration and authentication are enabled, but certificate management and revocation become difficult and time-consuming
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments certificate management by introducing short-lived certificates (valid for 1-24 hours) versus long-lived root certificates. This segmentation allows the system to generate many short-lived certificates automatically while maintaining manageable revocation lists, as each certificate has a limited scope and duration that simplifies tracking and revocation operations.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements preliminary actions by pre-establishing root certificates with long validity periods and pre-configuring revocation list mechanisms. When devices need authentication, the system can quickly issue short-lived certificates based on these pre-established roots, avoiding the need to manage revocation for every individual certificate in real-time.
2Ease of operation
If certificates have long validity periods, then device authentication is simplified, but security against compromised certificates deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies segmentation by dividing certificates into two tiers: long-lived root certificates (valid for years) that are rarely compromised and short-lived device certificates (valid for 1-24 hours) that are frequently issued and revoked. This allows simple authentication using long-lived roots while maintaining security through short-lived device certificates that limit the impact of compromises.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent treats device certificates as disposable short-lived objects that are automatically revoked after 1-24 hours. This approach prioritizes security over convenience for individual certificates, accepting that devices may experience brief authentication interruptions during revocation in exchange for robust security against compromised certificates.
3Reliability
If a global revocation list is maintained for all certificates, then certificate revocation effectiveness is improved, but system complexity and data storage requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the revocation list by organizing it around short-lived certificate identifiers rather than maintaining a single comprehensive list of all certificates. This segmentation allows the system to track and revoke certificates efficiently within manageable data structures, as each short-lived certificate has a limited scope and the revocation list can be organized by certificate ID, expiration time, or device identifier.
4Productivity
If certificate lifespan is extended, then authentication performance is improved, but security vulnerability window increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the authentication hierarchy into long-lived root certificates that provide stable authentication anchors and short-lived device certificates that minimize the vulnerability window. Root certificates can remain valid for years to maintain authentication performance, while device certificates are automatically revoked after 1-24 hours to limit the security vulnerability window for any potential compromises.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods are provided for managing a device in a vehicle, comprising: receiving a device registration request for the device; evaluating a list that includes a plurality of unique identifiers associated with a plurality of certificates; determining whether a particular unique identifier associated with a particular certificate is valid based on a length of time for the particular certificate; and communicating a signed version of the particular certificate to authorize a session for the device.


