Autonomous Vehicle Server Compromise Management
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Solution Overview
Problem
Autonomous vehicles are vulnerable to attacks if their cloud server is compromised, as malicious entities can send harmful commands, and restoring control can take an unknown amount of time, potentially causing significant damage.
Innovation Solution
Provisioning autonomous vehicles with a public key and a public key certificate before operation, allowing them to authenticate commands from a secondary server, which holds a private key split among administrators, stored in Hardware Security Modules, enabling override of malicious commands and switching to a backup server if compromised.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If the cloud server is given extensive control authority over autonomous vehicles, then the server can efficiently manage and coordinate vehicle operations, but the system becomes vulnerable to malicious attacks and compromised control
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments control authority by implementing a backup server architecture where control is divided between a primary cloud server and a secondary backup server. Each server has authenticated access credentials, allowing the backup server to take over if the primary server is compromised. This segmentation prevents a single point of failure and limits the impact of malicious attacks on one server.
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary actions by pre-configuring autonomous vehicles with authentication credentials for both the primary cloud server and the backup server before any compromise occurs. Vehicles are provisioned with certificates and keys that enable them to authenticate with either server, ensuring immediate failover capability without requiring real-time key distribution or complex cryptographic operations during an emergency.
2Device complexity
If the system uses a single cloud server for control, then the architecture remains simple and easy to manage, but the system lacks redundancy and becomes vulnerable to single-point failures
Solution Approach 1:
The control architecture is segmented into multiple independent server components (primary cloud server and backup server) rather than relying on a single centralized server. This segmentation provides redundancy while maintaining relatively simple individual server configurations, allowing the system to tolerate failures without requiring complex distributed consensus protocols.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the parameter of server availability from single-point to multi-point by introducing a backup server with identical functional capabilities. This parameter change increases reliability without fundamentally altering the core server architecture, as both servers operate using the same authentication and control protocols.
3Reliability
If the system implements backup server capability, then the system gains resilience against server compromise, but the authentication and command verification processes become more complex
Solution Approach 1:
Authentication credentials including certificates and cryptographic keys for both primary and backup servers are pre-configured in autonomous vehicles during manufacturing or initial deployment. This preliminary action eliminates the need for complex real-time credential distribution or registration processes, allowing vehicles to immediately authenticate with either server using pre-provisioned credentials.
Solution Approach 2:
The backup server uses identical authentication credentials and communication protocols as the primary server, creating a functional copy that can seamlessly replace the primary server. This copying approach simplifies the authentication process because vehicles interact with the backup server using the same methods they use with the primary server, without requiring new authentication mechanisms.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods for managing a compromised autonomous vehicle server are described herein. A processor may obtain an indication of a first server configured to control an autonomous vehicle being compromised. The autonomous vehicle may have previously been provisioned with a first public key. The first public key may be paired with a first private key. A processor may compile command information. The command information may include a command for the autonomous vehicle and a digital certificate of a second server configured to control the autonomous vehicle in the event of the first server being compromised. The digital certificate may include a second public key and may be signed with the first private key. The command may be signed with a second private key associated with the second server. The second private key may be paired with the second public key.