Autopilot Supervisor Segmentation for Unmanned Aircraft Safety
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Solution Overview
Problem
Light unmanned aircraft automatic piloting systems often fail to meet the reliability and safety standards required for commercial flight over populated areas, as they lack the robustness and high-level safety features necessary for compliance with civil aviation regulations.
Innovation Solution
An automatic piloting system with redundant and independent sensors and calculation channels, along with a supervisor that ensures only one calculation channel is actively controlling the aircraft at a time, providing a high level of reliability and safety by segregating piloting and supervision functions and implementing backup modes in case of failures.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If redundant and independent sensors and calculation channels are implemented, then reliability and safety levels increase, but device complexity and mass increase
Solution Approach 1:
The automatic piloting system is divided into multiple independent calculation channels (at least two), each with its own sensors and processing path. This segmentation allows the system to maintain high reliability through redundancy while keeping each individual channel relatively simple and manageable.
Solution Approach 2:
The system dynamically switches between different calculation channels based on their operational status. The supervisor monitors the health of each channel and can activate standby channels when primary channels fail, providing adaptive reliability without requiring all channels to be permanently active and complex.
2Reliability
If high reliability/safety level equipment is used, then compliance with civil aviation standards is achieved, but system mass increases
Solution Approach 1:
By segmenting the system into multiple independent channels where each channel can use simpler, lighter components, the overall system achieves high reliability through redundancy rather than through heavy-duty single-channel components. This allows compliance with aviation standards while minimizing mass.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses simplified copies (standby calculation channels) that replicate the essential functionality of the primary channel. These copies use less expensive and lighter components while still providing the necessary reliability when activated, reducing overall system mass compared to using only high-specification components throughout.
3Reliability
If multiple redundant calculation channels are implemented, then safety and reliability improve, but ease of manufacture decreases
Solution Approach 1:
The system is designed as modular segmented channels that can be manufactured and tested independently. Each calculation channel is a self-contained unit with its own sensors and processing, making it easier to manufacture using standard modular techniques while still achieving high reliability through the redundant architecture.
Solution Approach 2:
The calculation channels are designed to be universal and interchangeable, with each channel capable of performing the same piloting functions. This universality simplifies manufacturing by allowing the use of standardized components and assembly processes across all channels, reducing the complexity introduced by redundancy.
Data Source
Figure 1~2
AI summary
The present invention relates to an autopilot system (20) comprising an onboard assembly (25). The onboard assembly (25) includes several sets of redundant and independent sensors (40) and several processing channels (50), each processing channel (50) being connected to the sensors of said set of sensors (40) and receiving data from these sensors. A supervisor (60) is connected to the sensors of said set of sensors (40), the supervisor (60) having the function of coupling at most one of said processing channels (50) to control elements (30), said supervisor (60) having the function of decoupling the engaged processing channel from the control elements when a current behavior of the aircraft (1) differs from a predetermined predictive behavior.