Backscatter Sensor Authentication Using Encrypted Temporal Keys
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing wireless networks face challenges in securely onboarding Ambient Power Backscatter Devices (BKDs) and ensuring the authenticity of data frames transmitted by authorized BKDs, as rogue devices can compromise security by transmitting unauthorized or fake information.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a public-private key encryption system where BKDs are provided with a public key, and excitation frames containing encrypted temporal keys and network IDs are used to authenticate and encrypt sensor data, ensuring only legitimate BKDs can transmit valid data frames.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If Ambient Power Backscatter Devices are deployed in wireless networks, then network connectivity and device accessibility are improved, but network security and data authenticity are compromised due to rogue devices transmitting unauthorized information
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary authentication by providing each authorized BKD with a public key before deployment. The AP encrypts temporal keys and network IDs with these public keys in advance, so that when BKDs transmit frames, the authenticity can be verified without real-time complex authentication, thus enabling secure access for multiple devices
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces public-key encryption as an intermediary mechanism between the AP and BKDs. The public key acts as a mediator that allows the AP to securely distribute authentication credentials to BKDs without exposing secret keys, thereby enabling secure communication while maintaining device accessibility
2Reliability
If public-private key encryption is implemented for BKD authentication, then network security and data authenticity are improved, but system complexity and computational overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication system is segmented into distinct components: public key distribution phase, encrypted credential transmission phase, and frame authentication phase. Each phase handles a specific aspect of security, making the overall complex system manageable and implementable through standardized procedures
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses public keys as copies of authentication credentials that can be freely distributed without security risks. Instead of transmitting secret keys, the AP receives and stores public key copies for each authorized BKD, enabling authentication without increasing the complexity of key management
3Reliability
If encrypted temporal keys are transmitted to BKDs for data encryption, then communication security is improved, but transmission time and processing delays increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system uses temporal keys that are valid for specific time periods or transaction cycles. Each BKD receives encrypted temporal keys that are periodically updated, allowing authentication to be performed efficiently within each time window without requiring continuous re-authentication, thus reducing overall processing delays
Data Source
AI summary
Secure communication with a Backscatter Device (BKD) may be provided. A temporal key may be created. The temporal key and a network Identifier (ID) may be encrypted with a public key of a public private key pair associated with the BKD. An excitation frame including the encrypted temporal key and the encrypted network ID may be transmitted to the BKD. The AMP BKD may include a sensor. A BKD frame may be received from the BKD in response to the excitation frame. The BKD frame may include a sensor data encoded with the temporal key and the network ID as a target destination. The BKD frame may be signed using a private key of the public private key pair.