Binary Package Source Code Verification via Cryptographic Signatures
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Solution Overview
Problem
Users of binary software distributions cannot verify if the binary code matches the provided source code, as they lack the ability to parse and inspect binary code like they can with source code, leading to a reliance on trusting the distributor for signed packages, and generating binary packages from source code is computationally intensive, negating the benefits of open source software.
Innovation Solution
Incorporating a digest or cryptographic signature of the source code into the binary package, which can be verified by the recipient, and using an audit device to independently compile and sign the source code, providing additional authentication layers by including signatures/digests from both the vendor and audit device in the binary package.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If recipients generate binary packages from source code to verify integrity, then security and verification capability are improved, but computational resource consumption and time cost increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the essential verification information (signatures and digests) from the complex binary package generation process. Instead of requiring recipients to perform full compilation, the system extracts pre-computed cryptographic signatures and digests that can be verified independently, separating the heavy computational task from the verification process.
Solution Approach 2:
The distributor performs the computationally intensive actions of compiling source code to binary, generating digests, and creating signatures in advance. These preliminary actions include generating the binary package, computing its digest, and creating cryptographic signatures, all of which are prepared before distribution to recipients.
2Ease of operation
If recipients trust distributors for signed packages, then ease of operation is improved, but security and verification reliability deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces cryptographic signatures and digests as intermediary verification mechanisms between the distributor and recipient. These intermediaries provide objective, mathematically verifiable proof of integrity, replacing subjective trust with objective verification while maintaining ease of operation.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements feedback through verification mechanisms where recipients can check signatures and digests to confirm binary package integrity. This feedback loop allows recipients to verify that the binary was correctly compiled from the provided source code without requiring complex manual verification processes.
3Loss of information
If source code is provided with binary distributions for auditing, then transparency is improved, but recipients still cannot verify binary-source correspondence without generating binaries themselves
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces the mechanical process of compiling source code to verify binary correspondence with a cryptographic verification system. Instead of mechanically reproducing the compilation process, recipients use cryptographic algorithms to verify signatures and digests, substituting complex mechanical verification with simpler mathematical verification.
Solution Approach 2:
The system creates cryptographic copies (signatures and digests) of the source code and binary package that serve as verification tokens. These cryptographic copies contain essential integrity information that can be verified without needing to create full binary copies from source code.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods for language-agnostic unit testing are generally described. In various examples, first data including first source code written in a first programming language may be received. Configuration data configured to execute language-agnostic unit testing may be loaded. Input data may be determined from the first data based on a first input defined by the configuration data for a first unit test. A first driver written in the first programming language may be determined from the configuration data. The first driver may include computer-executable instructions configured to execute the first unit test. First output data may be generated by executing the first computer-executable instructions to perform the first unit test on the first input data.