Biometric Device Authentication via Hardware Root of Trust
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Solution Overview
Problem
Biometric data, being immutable, poses challenges in detecting and preventing unauthorized use, as corrective measures are more difficult to implement compared to traditional systems like lost or stolen cards or compromised passwords.
Innovation Solution
A system that ensures only device-attested biometric data from a trusted biometric device is processed, using hardware root of trust techniques, cryptographic processors, and trusted execution environments to establish a mutually authenticated communication channel, encrypt, and digitally sign biometric data, thereby associating it with the trusted device of origin.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If biometric data is collected and stored for user identification, then user authentication capability is improved, but security against unauthorized use deteriorates because biometric characteristics cannot be changed
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments biometric data processing into multiple independent components: a cryptographic processor that signs biometric data, a trusted execution environment that encrypts it, and a server that verifies authenticity. This segmentation ensures that no single component has access to all data, reducing unauthorized use risks while maintaining authentication capability
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary authentication actions by establishing a mutually authenticated communication channel before biometric data transmission. The cryptographic processor signs the biometric data in advance, and the server verifies this signature before processing, preventing unauthorized use while ensuring reliable authentication
2Object-affected harmful factors
If cryptographic processing is implemented to secure biometric data, then security against unauthorized use is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The cryptographic processor acts as an intermediary between the biometric sensor and the main processor. It signs biometric data before transmission and verifies cryptographic signatures from the server, providing security without requiring the main processor to handle cryptographic operations directly, thus managing complexity
3Reliability
If mutual authentication channel is established before data transmission, then data integrity and authenticity are improved, but communication time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The mutually authenticated communication channel is established in advance before biometric data transmission. The cryptographic processor and server perform authentication handshaking beforehand, storing session information that can be reused for subsequent transactions, reducing repeated authentication overhead while ensuring data integrity
Data Source
AI summary
During provisioning of a biometric device, a hardware root of trust is established between the biometric device and a server. The biometric device includes a cryptographic processor with a first encryption key stored in secure storage. The first encryption key is used to establish a mutually authenticated communication channel with the server. A set of additional encryption keys between the device and the server are established via the communication channel. Biometric data generated by the biometric device is encrypted using the additional keys and digitally signed. The server receives the encrypted and signed data via the communication channel and verifies the signature. Once the signature is verified, the biometric data is then decrypted. The server then processes the decrypted biometric data. Data that does not arrive via the communication channel, that fails the verification, or that fails decryption is deleted or disregarded.