Biometric Authentication Verification Using Zero-Knowledge Proofs
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing biometric authentication systems face challenges in ensuring user privacy and security, particularly in decentralized architectures where biometric data is processed on personal devices, as they are vulnerable to attacks and may compromise user data, and there is a risk of identity theft in recurring access scenarios.
Innovation Solution
A biometric data processing method that uses zero-knowledge proofs to verify the accuracy of biometric data on personal devices without transmitting the data itself, utilizing cryptographic hashes and timestamps, ensuring privacy and security by delegating calculation to the user's equipment.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If biometric data is stored on a centralized server for comparison, then authentication reliability is improved, but user data confidentiality and security are worsened due to hacking risks
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the authentication process into two parts: the centralized server stores only cryptographic hashes of biometric data, while the actual biometric comparison is performed locally on the user's personal device. This segmentation allows the server to verify authentication results without holding sensitive biometric data, thus maintaining both reliability and security.
Solution Approach 2:
Cryptographic hashes serve as an intermediary between the biometric data and the centralized server. The server stores and verifies hashes rather than the actual biometric data, acting as a mediator that enables authentication verification without direct exposure to sensitive user information, thereby reducing security risks.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If biometric comparison is performed on personal client devices, then user data confidentiality is improved, but authentication reliability is worsened due to device manipulation risks
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements a feedback mechanism where the personal device performs biometric comparison and sends the result back to the centralized server for verification. The server verifies the authenticity of the comparison result using cryptographic proof, providing feedback that confirms the reliability of the local authentication while maintaining data confidentiality.
Solution Approach 2:
The system dynamically adjusts the distribution of computational tasks between the personal device and the centralized server based on security requirements. The personal device performs the sensitive biometric comparison locally, while the server dynamically verifies the results using cryptographic protocols, adapting to different security contexts.
3Reliability
If cryptographic hashes of biometric data are transmitted to the server, then verification capability is improved, but user privacy is worsened due to potential interception and decryption
Solution Approach 1:
The system extracts only the essential verification element (cryptographic hash) from the complete biometric data and transmits it to the server. By taking out only what is necessary for verification and leaving the sensitive biometric information on the user's device, the system achieves verification capability while minimizing privacy exposure.
Data Source
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AI summary
The invention proposes a method for processing biometric data implemented by a connected proof entity (1) and a verification entity (2); the proof entity (1) having a candidate biometric data, a reference biometric data, a cryptographic hash of the reference biometric data, and a cryptographic hash of the candidate biometric data; the verification entity (2) having only a set of cryptographic hashes of reference biometric data of authorized users; the method comprising steps of: (a) generating by data processing means (11) of the proof entity (1) a zero-knowledge proof that the candidate biometric data and the reference biometric data match;(b) transmission to the verifying entity (2) of said zero-knowledge proof, the cryptographic hash of the candidate biometric data, and the cryptographic hash of the reference biometric data; (c) verification by data processing means (21) of the verifying entity (2) that: o the zero-knowledge proof is valid, and o the cryptographic hash received of the reference biometric data belongs to said set of cryptographic hashes of reference biometric data held by the verifying entity (2);