BLE RTT Attack Detection Using Fractional Timing Correction
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Solution Overview
Problem
RTT-based ranging techniques in BLE devices are vulnerable to spoofing attacks due to low sampling rates, which distort attack signatures and increase power consumption and memory utilization.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a receiver with receiving logic that uses fractional timing to adjust the correlation metric for attack detection, utilizing a set of coefficients calculated from training signals to minimize the impact of fractional delays.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Use of energy by moving object
If low sampling rate is used in RTT estimation, then power consumption and memory utilization are reduced, but attack detection capability deteriorates due to distorted attack signatures
Solution Approach 1:
The system pre-calculates and stores correction values in lookup tables during a training phase before actual operation. These pre-computed correction values are used to adjust correlation metrics during runtime without requiring complex real-time calculations, thus maintaining attack detection capability while operating at low sampling rates with reduced power consumption
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces correction values as an intermediary element that mediates between the low sampling rate measurements and the attack detection process. These correction values compensate for the distortion of attack signatures caused by low sampling rates, enabling reliable attack detection without requiring high sampling rates that would increase power consumption
2Quantity of substance
If low sampling rate is used in RTT estimation, then memory utilization is reduced, but attack signature distortion increases making detection more difficult
Solution Approach 1:
Correction values are pre-computed and stored in lookup tables during a training phase before actual operation. This preliminary action allows the system to have correction data ready without requiring large memory resources during runtime, as the complex calculations are performed in advance when more resources are available
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses pre-computed correction values that are copied from lookup tables during operation rather than recalculating them in real-time. This copying approach maintains attack signature integrity while minimizing memory utilization during actual attack detection operations
3Device complexity
If fractional delays are not compensated, then processing complexity is reduced, but measurement precision deteriorates in attack detection
Solution Approach 1:
The system pre-calculates correction values for fractional delays during a training phase and stores them in lookup tables. During actual operation, the system simply retrieves and applies these pre-computed correction values, avoiding complex real-time fractional delay compensation calculations while maintaining high measurement precision in attack detection
Solution Approach 2:
The patent transforms the continuous fractional delay compensation problem into a discrete lookup table retrieval problem by pre-computing correction values for different delay scenarios. This parameter transformation reduces processing complexity during operation while maintaining measurement precision through the use of pre-calibrated correction data
Data Source
AI summary
A wireless device includes a receiver adapted with Bluetooth® low energy (BLE) capability and logic at least one of coupled to or integrated within the receiver. The logic obtains, based on a received packet, a received signal. The logic identifies, based on the received signal and a reference signal, a fractional timing metric associated with the received signal. The logic calculates, based on the received signal, the reference signal, and an attack pattern, a correlation metric. The logic adjusts, based on the fractional timing metric, the correlation metric. The logic determines, based on the adjusted correlation metric and one or more thresholds, whether an attack is present in received signal.