Blockchain Node Group Incentive Management for Block Retention
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Solution Overview
Problem
In blockchain systems, the large data size of past blocks can lead to their deletion from nodes, resulting in a situation where a block is not held by any node, causing consensus algorithms to fail and preventing new blocks from being stored.
Innovation Solution
A blockchain management program that identifies specific groups of nodes holding ledgers and adjusts mining incentives based on whether the group corresponding to a past block is the same as the node's group, offering a higher incentive when it is, thereby encouraging nodes to hold past blocks within their group.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If nodes hold as many past blocks as possible to perform mining processes, then the reliability of consensus algorithm is improved, but the storage capacity requirement increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments nodes into multiple groups based on identification information, and further segments past blocks into different groups. Each node is configured to hold past blocks from multiple groups, ensuring that at least one node in each group retains necessary historical blocks for consensus operations, thereby maintaining reliability while distributing storage requirements across the network.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies local quality by making different nodes hold different sets of past blocks based on their group assignments. Instead of requiring all nodes to hold all past blocks, each node is assigned to hold blocks from specific groups, creating localized storage responsibilities that reduce individual node burden while ensuring global availability.
2Volume of stationary object
If nodes delete past blocks when total data size is large, then storage capacity is reduced, but the risk of block deletion from all nodes increases
Solution Approach 1:
By segmenting past blocks into multiple groups and assigning different groups to different nodes, the patent ensures that deletion of blocks from individual nodes does not result in complete loss of any block. Each block group has redundant copies across different nodes, providing fault tolerance against deletion.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the parameter of block retention by introducing group-based retention policies. Nodes retain blocks from multiple groups rather than all blocks, and the system dynamically determines which blocks to retain based on group assignments and node identities, optimizing the balance between storage and availability.
3Reliability
If incentive for mining success is increased to encourage nodes to hold past blocks, then block retention is improved, but energy consumption increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by providing differentiated incentives based on node group membership and block group associations. Nodes receive additional incentives only for holding blocks from their assigned groups, creating localized incentive structures that encourage necessary block retention without universally increasing energy consumption across all nodes.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the incentive parameter dynamically based on node identity, block group assignments, and mining success. The additional incentive mechanism adjusts the reward structure to reflect the specific contribution of holding particular block groups, optimizing the relationship between incentive expenditure and block retention effectiveness.
Data Source
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AI summary
A blockchain management program causes a computer to execute a process including: identifying a specific group that includes a subject device among a plurality of groups that each includes a plurality of devices that holds a ledger, based on identification information that corresponds to the subject device, in a mining process to generate a block from a newly generated transaction and store the block as part of the ledger; determining whether a group that corresponds to a past block selected during the mining process is the specific group; and determining an incentive for success in the mining process to be a first incentive when the group that corresponds to the past block is determined to be a group other than the specific group, and determining an incentive for success in the mining process to be a second incentive that is a sum of the first incentive and an additional incentive when the group that corresponds to the past block is determined to be the specific group.