Blockchain Information System with Smart Contract Incentives

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current information systems lack effective solutions for decentralized, expertly curated information delivery, leading to inefficiencies and the spread of disinformation due to the absence of financial incentives for quality content creation and curation.

Innovation Solution

A blockchain-based system that utilizes smart contracts and neural network algorithms to incentivize experts for creating and curating high-quality information, with users paying for access to answers and experts receiving rewards for their contributions, while a slashing pool penalizes low-quality content, thereby promoting accurate and relevant information.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If blockchain technology is used to create a decentralized information system, then information security and reliability are improved, but system complexity and difficulty of implementation increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveinformation securityVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces smart contracts as intermediary components that automatically enforce information quality standards and reward distributions. These smart contracts act as mediators between information providers, consumers, and quality validators, reducing the need for complex centralized coordination while maintaining system reliability through automated enforcement of rules.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements self-service mechanisms where the blockchain network automatically validates information quality, distributes rewards to providers, and penalizes low-quality contributions through programmable smart contracts. This self-service approach reduces operational complexity by eliminating manual intervention while maintaining high reliability through cryptographic verification and automated quality assessment protocols.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

2Reliability

If expert curation is incentivized through financial rewards, then information quality improves, but system costs and economic complexity increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveinformation qualityVSAvoideconomic complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent changes the economic parameters of information creation by introducing token-based rewards and slashing penalties that dynamically adjust based on information quality metrics. This parameter change transforms the incentive structure from traditional monetary transactions to a token economy with automated quality-based distribution, improving information quality while managing economic complexity through programmable reward schedules and transparent allocation rules.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback mechanisms where information quality is continuously assessed and reward/penalty allocations are adjusted based on performance metrics. Smart contracts automatically distribute rewards to high-quality contributors and apply slashing penalties to low-quality providers, creating a self-correcting feedback loop that maintains information quality while simplifying economic management through automated performance-based allocation rather than complex manual evaluation processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

3Reliability

If a slashing pool is implemented to penalize low-quality content, then information reliability improves, but system complexity and potential for abuse increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveinformation reliabilityVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements preliminary anti-action by pre-establishing slashing pools and penalty mechanisms before low-quality information is introduced. Smart contracts are programmed with predefined slashing conditions and penalty allocations that automatically execute when quality thresholds are violated, preventing the propagation of harmful information before it can cause significant damage while maintaining system reliability through proactive rather than reactive enforcement.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #9Preliminary anti-action

Solution Approach 2:

The system performs preliminary actions by requiring information providers to stake tokens or post bonds before contributing content. These preliminary commitments create skin in the game, ensuring providers have incentives to maintain quality. The slashing pools are pre-configured with allocation rules that automatically execute upon quality violations, reducing system complexity by eliminating the need for complex post-violation investigation and penalty determination processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS20230252510A1Systems and methods for blockchain-based information sharing
Publication Date: 2023.08.10 UMEDHUB INC
  • US20230252510A1 patent drawing
  • US20230252510A1 patent drawing
  • US20230252510A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Systems and methods are disclosed for managing information. In certain embodiments, a server receives one or more information queries and associated entries and stores references to them as well as associated metadata as a smart contract. The server then modified references and metadata of the entries/queries based on expert and user interactions. The economic activity of these interactions is guided by organizations of self-governing expert participants who are responsible for setting prices, community policies, and credentialling requirements. Over-time the incentive mechanisms of the protocol, incentive mechanisms associated with governance and constant improvement of input/output algorithms via neural network analyses of iterative user-system interactions optimize the function and increase the value of the knowledge economy, creating vibrant knowledge marketplaces that collect fees in exchange for data distribution to users and distribute those fees among expert individuals and their knowledge communities.