BMC TLS Session Renegotiation for Malicious Agent Mitigation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Information handling systems face challenges in securing connections between a baseboard management controller (BMC) and a hosted agent, particularly against malicious agents that can exploit TLS sessions and conduct denial-of-service attacks by failing to register, leading to resource overtaxing.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of a Transport Layer Security (TLS) session renegotiation mechanism, where the BMC establishes a second TLS session with a suspected malicious agent, shares a new cryptographic parameter, and initiates a renegotiation process to secure communication by broadcasting a renegotiation request encrypted with additional symmetric or public/private keys, effectively closing invalid sessions.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the BMC establishes a TLS session with a hosted agent, then secure communication is achieved, but malicious agents can exploit the TLS session to conduct denial-of-service attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The BMC performs preliminary registration verification before allowing full communication. The hosted agent must register with the BMC before establishing a TLS session, and the BMC verifies this registration status. This preliminary action prevents malicious agents from exploiting TLS sessions for denial-of-service attacks by ensuring only registered agents can communicate.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements feedback mechanisms where the BMC monitors TLS sessions and provides feedback to close invalid or suspicious sessions. When the BMC detects a malicious agent attempting to exploit a TLS session, it receives feedback about the suspicious activity and responds by closing the session, preventing denial-of-service attacks.
2Adaptability or versatility
If the BMC allows TLS session renegotiation, then communication flexibility is improved, but resource overtaxing from unregistered agents occurs
Solution Approach 1:
The BMC performs preliminary registration verification before allowing TLS session renegotiation. Hosted agents must be registered with the BMC before they can initiate or continue TLS sessions. This preliminary action ensures that only authorized agents can renegotiate sessions, preventing resource overtaxing from unregistered agents while maintaining communication flexibility for legitimate agents.
3Reliability
If the BMC implements strict registration requirements, then security against malicious agents is improved, but connection establishment complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The hosted agent performs self-service by automatically handling its own registration with the BMC. The agent includes registration functionality that allows it to autonomously establish its identity and credentials with the BMC without requiring manual intervention or complex configuration. This self-service approach simplifies connection establishment while maintaining security through automatic verification.
Data Source
AI summary
An information handling system includes a processor, a baseboard management controller (BMC) agent that establishes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) session including a first cryptographic parameter shared between the BMC and the BMC agent, receives a request to register the BMC agent with the BMC via the TLS session, and provides a second cryptographic parameter to the BMC agent. The BMC establishes a second TLS session including a third cryptographic parameter, determines that the second TLS session is suspected of being from a malicious agent, and renegotiates with the BMC agent using the second cryptographic parameter within the TLS session to share a fourth cryptographic parameter between the BMC and the first BMC agent in response to determining that the second TLS session is suspect.