Wireless Body Sensor Network Key Protocol Using Environmental Nonces
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing key establishment protocols for wireless body sensor networks face challenges due to resource limitations, such as limited computational power and energy constraints, and require all sensor nodes to measure the same physiological phenomenon for secure communication, making them vulnerable to remote attacks and inefficient in terms of message overhead.
Innovation Solution
A new key establishment protocol that uses environmental data, such as physiological values, as nonce values, allowing a trusted third party to measure and translate these values between sensor nodes, eliminating the need for all nodes to measure the same data and reducing message overhead by using nonces that do not require cryptographic strength.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional key establishment protocols are used in wireless body sensor networks, then security can be provided through encryption, but the resource-constrained sensor nodes experience high energy consumption and computational overhead
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the nonce generation function from the sensor nodes and relocates it to the trusted third party. The TTP generates nonces and includes them in authentication constructs sent to sensor nodes, eliminating the need for sensor nodes to perform computationally intensive nonce generation and cryptographic operations, thereby reducing their energy consumption while maintaining security
Solution Approach 2:
The trusted third party acts as an intermediary that facilitates key establishment between sensor nodes. The TTP generates authentication constructs containing nonces and sends them to both the sensor node and the remote node, mediating the security protocol execution and reducing the computational burden on resource-constrained sensor nodes
2Reliability
If all sensor nodes measure the same physiological phenomenon for key establishment, then secure communication can be established, but the protocol becomes vulnerable to remote attacks and requires significant message overhead
Solution Approach 1:
The trusted third party serves as an intermediary that generates nonces and creates authentication constructs that are sent to both sensor nodes and remote nodes. This mediation ensures that the same nonce is used by both parties for key establishment without requiring them to measure the same physiological data, preventing remote attacks while reducing message overhead
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the requirement for synchronized physiological measurement from the protocol and replaces it with TTP-generated nonces. The TTP obtains environmental data independently and uses it to create authentication constructs, eliminating the vulnerability to remote attacks associated with synchronized measurement while maintaining secure communication
3Use of energy by moving object
If sensor nodes use limited computational power for cryptographic operations, then energy is conserved, but the security strength and resistance to attacks are reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the computationally intensive nonce generation and cryptographic key establishment operations from the sensor nodes and concentrates them in the trusted third party. The TTP performs the heavy computational work of generating secure nonces and creating authentication constructs, while sensor nodes only need to receive and use these pre-computed values, achieving both energy conservation and strong security
Solution Approach 2:
The trusted third party acts as a computational intermediary that handles the heavy cryptographic operations. By mediating the key establishment process and providing pre-computed authentication constructs, the TTP enables sensor nodes to participate in secure communication with minimal computational effort, balancing energy conservation with security strength
Data Source
AI summary
A key establishment protocol for securing wireless body sensor networks using environmental data for nonce values. To establish a secure communication between sensors in a sensor network using environmental data, the protocol measures a first environmental value at a first sensor and a trusted third party. A second environmental value is measured at a second sensor and the trusted third party. The trusted third party then sends to the second sensor a first authentication construct comprising the second environmental value, wherein the second environmental value is used by the second sensor to prevent replay attacks of messages between the trusted third party and second sensor. The trusted third party also sends to the first sensor a second authentication construct comprising the first environmental value, wherein the first environmental value is used by the first sensor to prevent replay attacks of messages between the trusted third party and first sensor.