Boot Integrity Verification via Cryptographic Proof Comparison

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current technologies fail to securely manage the boot process of devices, leaving them vulnerable to malware and attacks that can subvert security protections during the boot process, even with hardware-based root of trust implementations.

Innovation Solution

A system that includes a processor and a non-transitory computer-readable medium with instructions to verify cryptographic proofs and boot information generated by a trusted component, comparing initial and subsequent boot information to detect any unauthorized changes and generate alerts for permitted or unpermitted differences.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If hardware-based root of trust is implemented, then security protection is improved, but vulnerabilities during boot process remain

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity protectionVSAvoidboot process vulnerabilities
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary verification of boot components before the operating system takes control. A trusted component (such as a TPM) measures and verifies each boot component in advance, creating a chain of trust that prevents malware from executing even if hardware-based root of trust is present. This preliminary verification addresses the boot process vulnerability by ensuring integrity before full system operation begins.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If boot process verification is enhanced, then security is improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveboot securityVSAvoidverification system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a trusted component (such as a Trusted Platform Module or TPM) as an intermediary between the boot process and the verification system. This intermediary handles the complex cryptographic operations and measurements, isolating the complexity from the main verification logic. The trusted component acts as a mediator that simplifies the overall system architecture while providing robust security verification capabilities.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Measurement precision

If cryptographic verification is performed on all boot components, then integrity is improved, but processing time increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveboot information integrityVSAvoidboot verification time
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The verification process is segmented into distinct stages, with each boot component verified individually as it loads rather than verifying the entire boot process at once. The trusted component divides boot verification into manageable measurement steps, allowing the system to verify critical components quickly while maintaining comprehensive integrity checking. This segmentation enables parallel processing and reduces the perceived verification time while preserving measurement precision.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentUS10762209B2Boot security
Publication Date: 2020.09.01 SOPHOS LTD
  • US10762209B2 patent drawing
  • US10762209B2 patent drawing
  • US10762209B2 patent drawing

AI summary

In one aspect, a method for securing a device includes receiving a first set of boot information of a device, receiving a first cryptographic proof of the first set of boot information, receiving a second set of boot information of the device, receiving a second cryptographic proof of the second set of boot information, comparing the first set of boot information and the second set of boot information, and, upon determining that the first set of boot information and the second set of boot information are different, determining whether differences between the first set of boot information and the second set of boot information are permitted. The method may also include generating an alert upon determining that differences between the first set of boot information and the second set of boot information are not permitted.