Boot-Time Endpoint Authentication via Component Binding
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Existing authentication methods for communication endpoints are inadequate as they fail to verify the presence of multiple components, including secure memory devices, hardware, and software, making them vulnerable to impersonation attacks, especially when certificates generated at boot time can be stolen and reused.
Innovation Solution
A security manager in the memory sub-system generates a boot-time certificate that combines the identity of a secure memory device with other components, using cryptographic keys and a monotonically increasing counter to ensure the endpoint's integrity and freshness, thereby strengthening the authentication process.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional authentication methods are used, then the authentication process is simple, but the system is vulnerable to impersonation attacks and certificate theft
Solution Approach 1:
The patent combines multiple authentication components (secure memory device, processor, chipset) into a single boot-time certificate. This merging approach strengthens authentication security by verifying the entire system configuration rather than individual components, preventing impersonation attacks while maintaining manageable complexity through unified certificate validation
Solution Approach 2:
The authentication process performs preliminary verification of multiple system components during boot time before the system becomes operational. By establishing the certificate early in the boot sequence, the system prevents unauthorized access and certificate theft that would occur if authentication were delayed or performed separately
2Reliability
If boot-time certificates are generated without component binding, then the authentication process is fast, but certificates can be stolen and reused for impersonation
Solution Approach 1:
The patent merges the identification data of multiple components (secure memory device, processor, chipset) into a single certificate generation process. This binding ensures certificate authenticity by making each certificate unique to the specific system configuration, while the combined process completes efficiently during boot time without significant delay
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary binding of component identifiers to the certificate during boot time, creating an anti-impersonation mechanism before any potential attacks can occur. This preliminary action embeds unique system fingerprints in the certificate, preventing theft and reuse while maintaining fast authentication
3Reliability
If multiple components are verified in authentication, then impersonation attacks are prevented, but the authentication mechanism becomes more complex
Solution Approach 1:
The patent combines verification of multiple components (secure memory device, processor, chipset) into a single integrated certificate. This merging approach maintains impersonation resistance by verifying the entire system configuration while reducing the perceived complexity through unified certificate validation rather than separate component checks
Solution Approach 2:
The system creates a cryptographic copy (certificate) that encapsulates the identity and configuration of multiple components. This copying approach allows verification of complex multi-component systems through a single simplified certificate structure, maintaining security while reducing verification complexity
Data Source
AI summary
A system, method and apparatus to authenticate an endpoint having a secure memory device. For example, at boot time of the endpoint, a cryptographic hash value of the boot loader stored in the memory device is used to generate a device identifier of the memory device; and identification data of multiple components of the endpoint is used with the device identifier of the memory device to generate a first key pair key and a second key. A counter value is retrieved from a monotonic counter to generate a certificate signed using a private key in the first key pair. The certificate can be sent over the computer network to a remote server for authentication using a public key in the first key pair. The second key pair can be authenticated and used to establish encryption for a communication connection between the endpoint and the server.