Browser Digest Integrity Verification for Man-in-the-Browser Detection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current security measures are inadequate in defending against man-in-the-browser attacks, where malware compromises client web browsers to gain unauthorized access to web application servers, as these attacks are difficult to detect and often rely on user inconsistency or resource unavailability.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a security gateway that performs shape tests and digest tests to detect malware by analyzing HTTP messages and responses, comparing digests computed on both the server and client sides to identify modifications made by malware, and taking defensive measures such as blocking malicious requests or alerting administrators.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional security measures are used to protect servers and databases, then server-side security is improved, but client-side attacks using compromised browsers cannot be detected
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of only protecting the server from client attacks, the patent inverts the approach by having the server send integrity verification code to the client, which then verifies the client's browser integrity. This reversal allows detection of compromised browsers while maintaining server-side security controls.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary integrity verification mechanism where the server sends a verification code through the HTTP response, the client's browser computes a digest of the code, and this digest is sent back to the server for comparison. This intermediary process enables detection of browser compromise without direct server-client trust assumptions.
2Reliability
If digest verification code is included in every HTTP response, then attack detection capability is improved, but network bandwidth and processing overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by making the integrity verification optional rather than universal. The server can selectively include or exclude the verification code in HTTP responses based on risk assessment, user session state, or other criteria, allowing verification where needed while minimizing overhead elsewhere.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements partial action by not requiring verification in every single HTTP response. Instead, verification can be performed selectively based on security requirements, reducing the overall bandwidth and processing overhead while maintaining adequate detection coverage for critical interactions.
3Measurement precision
If integrity verification is performed on every HTTP transaction, then transaction integrity is improved, but processing time and system complexity increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by having the server pre-compute and send the integrity verification code with the HTTP response before the client needs to verify it. The client then computes the digest and sends it back, allowing verification to occur in advance of potential security incidents rather than reacting after compromise.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent segments the integrity verification process into distinct components: the server generates and sends verification code, the client computes the digest of received content, and the client sends the computed digest back to the server. This segmentation allows each component to be optimized independently and enables selective application of verification steps.
Data Source
AI summary
The detection of web browser-based attacks using browser tests launched from a remote source is described. In one example, a digest is computed based on the content of an HTTP response message. The message is modified and sent to a client device that also computes a digest. The digests are compared to determine whether content has been modified by malware on the HTTP client. The results of the test are analyzed and defensive measures are taken.