Build Integrity Verification via Replica Comparison
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods fail to effectively detect malicious code injections during the code build process, as sophisticated malware can compromise production builds without causing failures or alerts, making it difficult to verify build integrity before deployment.
Innovation Solution
Performing a production build and multiple replica builds, which are then compared to detect any differences, utilizing a build integrity verification module to indicate intrusions and mark builds as safe for further use, with the production and replica builds processed on physical or virtual machines within a cloud-based system.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional build processes are used without verification, then build speed and simplicity are maintained, but build integrity cannot be verified and malicious code injections go undetected
Solution Approach 1:
The patent creates multiple replica builds (copies) of the production build on different machines. These replica builds are identical copies that can be compared to detect any tampering. The copying principle allows verification of build integrity by comparing multiple identical instances, where any difference indicates potential malicious injection.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements feedback by comparing the production build against replica builds and providing verification results. The comparison process generates feedback information about build integrity, indicating whether the build is safe or has been compromised. This feedback mechanism enables continuous verification without requiring manual intervention.
2Reliability
If multiple replica builds are performed and compared, then build integrity verification is achieved, but build time and computational resources increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent performs build verification as a preliminary action before deployment. By completing the comparison of production and replica builds beforehand, the system ensures that only verified builds are deployed. This preliminary verification prevents costly post-deployment security issues while maintaining efficient deployment processes.
Solution Approach 2:
The replica builds are temporary, disposable objects created solely for verification purposes. After the comparison is complete, the replica builds can be discarded. This approach minimizes resource consumption since the replica builds exist only briefly during the verification process and do not need to be preserved long-term.
3Difficulty of detecting and measuring
If sophisticated malware is introduced during code build, then code injection occurs without build failure or alerts, but build integrity remains compromised and difficult to detect
Solution Approach 1:
By creating multiple replica builds on different machines, the system generates identical copies that serve as reference points. If malware is injected into the production build, the replica builds remain clean and reveal the tampering through comparison. This copying strategy makes sophisticated malware detection feasible by having known-good references to compare against.
Solution Approach 2:
The replica builds act as intermediaries between the production build and the verification process. Instead of directly analyzing the production build for malware, the system uses replica builds as intermediary references. This intermediary approach simplifies detection by comparing against known-good copies rather than attempting to detect subtle malware signatures.
Data Source
AI summary
The present disclosure relates to systems and methods for production build integrity verification. In embodiments, systems and methods include performing a production build of a program and performing a plurality of replica builds of the program. The plurality of replica builds of the program and the production build of the program are compared to find any differences in the builds to determine if an intrusion has happened. The comparison can take place in a build integrity verification machine which sends the results back to a production machine. Code injection can happen during the code build process, but the present solution makes this attack almost unachievable because it will be detected before the software build is deployed for customer's use.