Buried Doped Bars for Chip Security Against Ion Beam Attacks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Electronic chips containing confidential data are vulnerable to attacks such as fault-injection and focused ion beam attacks, where attackers disrupt chip operation to extract sensitive information, and existing protection methods are inadequate.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of buried doped bars of a first conductivity type within a substrate of a second conductivity type, with detection circuits to monitor electric characteristics, including discontinuities, bias currents, and resistance variations, to detect anomalies and trigger countermeasures.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional protection methods are used, then chip security is improved, but device complexity and surface area increase
Solution Approach 1:
The protection system is segmented into multiple independent buried bars distributed throughout the chip volume, each capable of detecting attacks independently. This segmentation allows the security function to be distributed rather than concentrated in a single complex structure, reducing overall system complexity while maintaining high reliability through redundancy
Solution Approach 2:
The invention transitions from two-dimensional surface-based protection to three-dimensional volumetric protection by burying conductive bars throughout the chip substrate. This dimensional change enables attack detection from multiple spatial perspectives simultaneously, improving security coverage without proportionally increasing surface area or device complexity
2Measurement precision
If detection circuits are added to monitor electric characteristics, then attack detection capability is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The detection circuits are designed to monitor multiple electric characteristics (continuity, resistance, carrier injection) using a unified approach. The same basic circuit architecture can detect different types of attacks by monitoring different electrical parameters, reducing overall circuit complexity compared to having separate specialized circuits for each attack type
Solution Approach 2:
The buried bars themselves serve dual functions: they are part of the normal chip operation (providing electrical connections) and simultaneously serve as sensors for attack detection. This self-service approach eliminates the need for separate dedicated sensor structures, reducing device complexity while maintaining detection capability
3Reliability
If buried bars are placed under wells, then attack detection coverage is improved, but manufacturing precision requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The buried bars are strategically positioned in specific locations under the wells where attack vectors are most likely to occur. Rather than uniform distribution throughout the entire chip, the bars are concentrated in high-risk areas, providing optimal detection coverage while reducing the total number of bars and associated manufacturing precision requirements
Applied Scientific Principles
This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.
Function Achieved in This Case
The solution effectively protects electronic chips against fault-injection and focused ion beam attacks by detecting anomalies in electric characteristics, allowing for immediate countermeasures to prevent data extraction and chip operation disruption, while minimizing surface area dedicated to security features.
Implementation Method 1
a circuit for detecting an anomaly of an electric characteristic of the bars
Implementation Method 2
the bars are of a first conductivity type and are buried in a substrate of a second conductivity type
Data Source
AI summary
An electronic chip including a plurality of buried doped bars and a circuit for detecting an anomaly of an electric characteristic of the bars.