Calling Party Validation via Dual-Channel Code Verification
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Existing voice call authentication methods are vulnerable to spoofing, as they rely on shared secrets that can be intercepted, making it difficult for called parties to verify the authenticity of incoming calls, especially when previous communications have been compromised.
Innovation Solution
A method involving a server that monitors two separate communications paths, one for voice calls and another for data, where a code entered by the call recipient is compared with a shared code, ensuring authenticity by preventing code exposure during the call, thus protecting against spoofing attempts.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a shared secret code is used for call authentication, then the called party can verify the calling party's identity, but the system becomes vulnerable to spoofing if previous communications are intercepted
Solution Approach 1:
The system generates and shares a secret code between the called party and the network infrastructure before the call occurs. This preliminary code exchange establishes a trusted channel that cannot be compromised during the actual call, preventing spoofing attacks.
Solution Approach 2:
The network infrastructure (SMS gateway, signaling system) acts as a trusted intermediary that securely manages the secret code. The called party never directly shares the code with the calling party; instead, the network verifies the code during call setup, eliminating the risk of interception between parties.
2Ease of operation
If the code is shared over the same communications path as the voice call, then the authentication process is simpler, but the code becomes vulnerable to interception and spoofing
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication system separates the code exchange channel from the voice call channel. The secret code is transmitted through a dedicated signaling path (SMS, register-dial-register protocol) independent of the voice communications path, ensuring that even if the voice channel is compromised, the authentication code remains secure.
Solution Approach 2:
The system moves the code exchange from the voice domain to a separate data/signaling dimension. By using SMS or signaling system messages for code transmission rather than voice calls, the authentication occurs in a different communications dimension that is not vulnerable to voice call interception or spoofing.
3Reliability
If a verification code is incorporated in the call data, then the called party can identify genuine calls from trusted parties, but the shared secret becomes apparent from intercepted calls
Solution Approach 1:
The network infrastructure serves as a confidential intermediary that holds and verifies the secret code. The code is never exposed in the call data stream between parties; instead, the network silently verifies the code during call setup and only allows genuine calls to proceed, preventing secret exposure while maintaining reliable identification.
Data Source
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
AI summary
In order to confirm that a telephone call received by a network termination (12) on a first connection (16) is from a trusted party (10), the called party connects over a second, independent, connection (17) to a server (15) associated with the trusted party (10) and shares a code with the server (15). That code is then transmitted over the first (connection (16) and, if the connection is genuine, it is intercepted by the server (15) which generates a message over the second connection (17) confirming that the code has been matched. This gives the called party assurance that the call is from a party (10) associated with the trusted server (15). If a rogue caller (20) attempts to call the termination (12), the called party's transmission of the shared code will be routed over the caller's connection (26), which is not associated with the trusted server (15), so no match will be identified by the server (15) and no confirmation is returned over the second connection.