CAN Message Authentication Using Group Key Segmentation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Control Area Networks (CAN) systems are vulnerable to malware infections and loss of control due to the lack of effective message authentication mechanisms, which can lead to false data injection attacks and compromised electronic control units (ECUs), especially in critical systems like vehicles.

Innovation Solution

A computer-implemented method for authenticating messages in a CAN using a group key-based authentication scheme, where each device is assigned a trust level and a shared group key, allowing verification of messages through a hash value computed using a counter and session number, thereby filtering out false data and preventing attacks.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If message authentication mechanisms are implemented in CAN systems, then security against malware and false data injection is improved, but device complexity and computational overhead increase

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidcomplexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The authentication mechanism is segmented into distinct components: message identifiers are divided into groups based on trust levels, each group having its own authentication rules. This segmentation allows the system to apply complex authentication only where needed while keeping other communications simple, thus improving security without uniformly increasing complexity across all CAN messages.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Different authentication requirements are applied locally based on message identifier groups and trust levels. High-trust messages use simplified authentication while low-trust messages undergo more rigorous verification. This local differentiation improves overall security posture while minimizing the computational burden on the system.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

2Reliability

If group key-based authentication is used, then protection against false data injection is improved, but computational delay increases

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidcomputational delay
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs partial authentication actions based on message trust levels. For high-trust messages, minimal verification is performed (checking only the message identifier group), while for low-trust messages, full authentication with group key verification is applied. This partial action approach provides adequate security protection while minimizing unnecessary computational delay for trusted communications.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

3Productivity

If trust levels and message identifier grouping are implemented, then authentication efficiency is improved, but key management complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication efficiencyVSAvoidkey management
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

Multiple message identifiers are merged into groups based on their trust levels, with each group sharing a common authentication approach. This merging reduces the number of individual key management operations needed, as devices only need to manage group-level authentication parameters rather than individual keys for each message identifier, thus improving authentication efficiency while controlling key management complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

Data Source

PatentUS9231936B1Control area network authentication
Publication Date: 2016.01.05 GEN DIGITAL INC
  • US9231936B1 patent drawing
  • US9231936B1 patent drawing
  • US9231936B1 patent drawing

AI summary

A computer-implemented method for authenticating messages in a control area network is described. In one embodiment, a message identifier for a data message is ascertained. Each device is associated with one or more message identifiers. The data message is sent from a first device to a second device. The data message is associated with the ascertained message identifier. An authentication code computed by the first device is sent to the second device. The authentication code is sent by the first device in the data message or in an authentication message.