Card Chip Authentication for Low-Exposure Identity Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current identity verification and transaction authentication methods, particularly in electronic transactions, face significant risks of data breaches and exposure of sensitive information, leading to potential identity theft and fraud, which can result in financial and reputational damage, and impose substantial costs on individuals and entities to mitigate these risks.

Innovation Solution

A system and method utilizing chip-based identity verification, where a card chip is inserted into a user device, encrypted messages are transmitted between the chip and a server for verification, and access privileges are granted based on successful authentication, reducing the need for transmission of private information and enhancing data security.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If private information is transmitted for identity verification and transaction authentication, then verification can be performed, but data security risks increase and exposure to identity theft and fraud occurs

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveidentity verification reliabilityVSAvoiddata security risks
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts sensitive private information from the verification process. Instead of transmitting passwords, Social Security numbers, or other private data, the system uses a card chip that contains only a card number. The verification is performed by transmitting this extracted minimal information through encrypted channels, thereby eliminating the need to handle dangerous private information while maintaining verification reliability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary verification process that acts as a mediator between the user and the verification system. The card chip serves as an intermediary that generates verification codes based on encrypted algorithms, eliminating the need for direct transmission of private information. This intermediary mechanism enables verification while protecting against data exposure and identity theft.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If conventional authentication methods requiring private information are used, then identity verification can be performed, but costs for mitigating data breaches and identity theft increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication capabilityVSAvoidcosts for mitigating data breaches
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of energy

Solution Approach 1:

The system extracts only the essential verification element (card number from chip) while removing all unnecessary private information. This extraction approach reduces authentication costs by eliminating the need for expensive security infrastructure required to protect sensitive data such as passwords and personal identification numbers, while maintaining reliable authentication capability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

3Reliability

If private information is required for transactions, then authentication can be performed, but data security needs discourage or hinder transactions and divert resources

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetransaction authenticationVSAvoidtransaction convenience
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts minimal verification data (card number) from the card chip and uses this extracted information for authentication. This approach simplifies the transaction process by eliminating the need for users to provide extensive private information such as passwords, Social Security numbers, or answers to security questions, thereby improving transaction convenience while maintaining authentication reliability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

4Reliability

If extensive private information is collected for verification, then authentication can be performed, but the risk of identity theft and fraud increases causing financial and reputational damage

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveverification accuracyVSAvoididentity theft and fraud risks
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-generated harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system extracts only the card number from the chip for verification purposes, removing all other private information from the authentication process. This extraction principle eliminates the root cause of identity theft and fraud risks associated with collecting extensive private information, while verification accuracy is maintained through encrypted transmission and processing of the extracted card number.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The card chip acts as an intermediary that generates verification codes through encrypted algorithms. This intermediary mechanism prevents direct exposure of private information to the verification system, thereby eliminating identity theft and fraud risks while maintaining reliable verification accuracy through cryptographic protection.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS11715103B2Systems and methods for chip-based identity verification and transaction authentication
Publication Date: 2023.08.01 CAPITAL ONE SERVICES LLC
  • US11715103B2 patent drawing
  • US11715103B2 patent drawing
  • US11715103B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Example embodiments of systems, methods, and computer-accessible mediums for identity verification and transaction authentication are provided. An exemplary system can comprise an application, a user device, and a server. The application can prompt a removal of a card chip, prompt an insertion of the card chip into the user device, determine an orientation of the card chip after the insertion of the card chip into the user device, and transmit, to the card chip, a first message. The card chip can encrypt the first message via one or more authentication protocols to generate an encrypted first message, transmit, to the server, the encrypted first message. The server can decrypt the encrypted first message, verify the decrypted first message, and transmit a second message to the application, wherein the application is configured to display a verification notification in response to the second message.