Cellular GNSS Anomaly Detection for Spoofing and Jamming
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Existing systems are vulnerable to GPS jamming and spoofing attacks, which compromise the accuracy and reliability of GNSS signals, particularly in autonomous and safety-critical applications, and current detection methods require significant additional hardware and processing.
Innovation Solution
Utilize stationary GNSS receivers integrated into cellular network infrastructure, such as base stations, to continuously monitor and analyze GNSS signals for anomalies by comparing historical data with real-time measurements, employing statistical and machine learning techniques to detect and localize spoofing and jamming attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If additional detection hardware and processing systems are deployed to detect GPS jamming and spoofing attacks, then detection capability and reliability are improved, but system complexity and cost increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent reuses existing cellular network infrastructure (base stations with integrated GNSS receivers) for dual purposes: original network synchronization functions and GNSS anomaly detection. This eliminates the need for dedicated detection hardware while maintaining detection capability across wide geographic areas.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses the cellular network's own existing GNSS receivers and infrastructure to perform detection, rather than requiring external or additional specialized equipment. The base stations' built-in GNSS capabilities are leveraged for security monitoring purposes.
2Device complexity
If existing cellular infrastructure is utilized for GNSS anomaly detection, then cost and device complexity are reduced, but detection coverage and reliability may be limited
Solution Approach 1:
The patent transitions from individual receiver detection to network-wide distributed detection by utilizing multiple base stations across geographic areas. This spatial dimension expansion enables area-wide coverage and cross-validation of anomalies, significantly improving detection reliability without adding complex centralized systems.
Solution Approach 2:
The detection system is divided into distributed segments at multiple base stations, each independently monitoring GNSS signals. This segmentation allows parallel detection across wide areas while maintaining simplicity at each individual node, combining to provide comprehensive coverage.
Data Source
Figure 1
Figure 2~3
Figure 4
AI summary
Provided are a method and a system for detecting position measurement anomalies in a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) for a plurality of stationary GNSS receivers. Therein, GNSS measurement indication from a GNSS receiver is determined to be affected by an anomaly if the GNSS measurement indication is not received at a configured timing, if the measured GNSS signal parameter value is invalid or deviates from a recorded position of the GNSS receiver or from a recorded GNSS signal parameter value from a past measurement by the stationary GNSS receiver. Accordingly, the present disclosure facilitates cost efficient, area-wide, high-resolution, and continuous monitoring of GNSS anomalies (such as spoofing or jamming attacks).