Channel Measurement Field Randomization Against Malicious Receivers
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Solution Overview
Problem
Devices under malicious control can exploit packet transmission for malicious purposes in wireless sensing and positioning, necessitating improved security measures.
Innovation Solution
Implement pseudo-random phase and amplitude shifts in channel measurement fields of packets to degrade temporal coherence of measurements by maliciously controlled receivers, while maintaining communication performance for authorized receivers.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If pseudo-random phase and amplitude shifts are applied to channel measurement fields, then security against malicious receivers is improved, but measurement precision for authorized receivers may deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
Different quality treatment is applied to different receivers: authorized receivers receive channel measurement fields with known transmitter configurations for precise measurements, while malicious receivers encounter pseudo-randomly varying configurations that degrade measurement quality. This local differentiation resolves the contradiction by tailoring the measurement quality to the receiver's authorization status.
Solution Approach 2:
The transmitter configuration for channel measurement fields is made dynamic through pseudo-random phase and amplitude shifts that vary over time. This dynamic variation prevents malicious receivers from performing coherent measurements across multiple packets, while authorized receivers can track and compensate for these variations to maintain measurement precision.
2Reliability
If transmitter configurations are varied pseudo-randomly for channel measurement fields, then temporal coherence of measurements by malicious receivers is degraded, but communication reception performance difference remains within threshold
Solution Approach 1:
Physical parameters of the transmitter configuration (phase and amplitude) are changed pseudo-randomly for channel measurement fields. These parameter changes are controlled to remain within thresholds that do not significantly impact communication reception performance, while being sufficient to degrade temporal coherence for malicious measurement operations.
3Reliability
If multiple transmitter configurations with different phase and amplitude shifts are used, then security against packet exploitation is enhanced, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system uses its own existing transmitter configuration mechanisms to provide security functionality. By leveraging the existing capability to adjust phase and amplitude for different transmissions, the system generates pseudo-random variations without requiring separate dedicated security hardware or complex additional components.
Data Source
AI summary
Transmission of one or more packets in a communication environment. Each packet includes one or more channel measurement fields, and the one or more packets together comprising at least first and second channel measurement fields. A first transmitter configuration for the first channel measurement field and a second transmitter configuration for the second channel measurement field are selected. The first and second transmitter configurations include pseudo-randomly different phase and/or amplitude shifts for the channel measurement fields. A method is also disclosed for a receiver configured to perform measurements on one or more packets in a communication environment. The first transmitter configuration for the first channel measurement field and the second transmitter configuration for the second channel measurement field are handshaked with a transmitter of the one or more packets, the one or more packets are received, and measurements performed on the received packets for wireless sensing and/or wireless positioning.