Chassis Device Security via Boot Chain Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Information handling systems lack robust security measures to establish trust between devices within a chassis system, particularly in verifying the authenticity of bootloaders, kernels, and device unique certifications, which is crucial for secure communication and preventing unauthorized access.
Innovation Solution
A method that involves each computing device in a chassis system verifying its bootloader and kernel using fused keys and hidden root keys, respectively, to decrypt device unique certifications, and then generating a proof-of-possession to establish a secure communication channel, ensuring all devices run signed code and are trusted within the system.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If traditional communication protocols are used between devices in a chassis system, then device compatibility and ease of operation are improved, but security and trust verification between devices deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary security actions by establishing a chain of trust during the boot process before any communication occurs. The bootloader verifies the kernel signature, and the kernel verifies device identity credentials before the device becomes operational, ensuring security is built-in from the start rather than added later
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces cryptographic intermediaries including trusted platform modules (TPM), secure enclave modules (SEM), and hardware security modules (HSM) that act as mediators between devices. These intermediaries hold and manage cryptographic keys and credentials, enabling secure verification without exposing sensitive security mechanisms
2Reliability
If security verification mechanisms are implemented to verify bootloader and kernel authenticity, then device security and trust are improved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the security verification process into distinct stages: bootloader verification of kernel, kernel verification of device credentials, and communication channel establishment. Each stage has specific security checks and uses different cryptographic mechanisms, making the complex security system manageable and verifiable
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements self-verification where each device autonomously verifies its own bootloader and kernel through cryptographic signatures stored in secure hardware. Devices independently establish their own trust credentials without requiring external verification authorities, reducing overall system complexity
3Object-affected harmful factors
If cryptographic verification of bootloaders and kernels is performed, then prevention of unauthorized access is improved, but processing time and energy consumption increase
Solution Approach 1:
Cryptographic verification is performed as a preliminary action during the boot process before the device becomes fully operational. The bootloader verifies the kernel signature during initialization, and the kernel verifies device credentials before establishing communication channels, ensuring security checks occur once during startup rather than continuously during operation
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses cryptographic copies and hashes of bootloaders and kernels for verification instead of comparing entire binary images. Secure hardware modules store cryptographic representations of authorized firmware, and verification involves comparing cryptographic hashes rather than full binary content, significantly reducing processing requirements
Data Source
AI summary
Methods, systems, and computer programs encoded on computer storage medium, for verifying, by a mask ROM of a CPU of a first computing device and with fused keys included by the CPU, a boot loader that is included by a flash memory of the first computing device, in response to verifying the boot loader, verifying, by the boot loader and with boot loader keys included by the flash memory, a kernel included by the a memory device of the first computing device, in response to verifying the kernel, decrypting, by the kernel using a hidden root key (HRK) included by the CPU of the first computing device, a device unique certification (DUC) included by the flash memory, in response to decrypting the DUC, generating, by the first computing device, a proof-of-possession of the DUC.