Chip Enable Protection Circuit for Secure Memory Access

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional electronic devices lack robust security measures to protect memory devices from unauthorized access, particularly in scenarios where repeated hacking attempts can breach the system, and there is a need for strong protection against theft.

Innovation Solution

A secured chip enable method and chip enable protection circuit are implemented, which require a correct passcode for memory device access and permanently disable the memory device after a maximum number of incorrect access attempts, using a chip enable protection circuit that integrates a passcode storage element, a passcode compare circuit, and a counter to track attempts, ensuring the memory device can only be accessed with the correct passcode.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If conventional protection methods are used for memory devices, then the system can be accessed normally, but the system can be breached by hacking attempts using hundreds or thousands of access cycles

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity protectionVSAvoidaccess control mechanism
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements a counter mechanism that预先 (in advance) tracks the number of access cycles before a breach can occur. The counter is initialized to a predetermined value (e.g., 1000) and decrements with each access cycle. When the counter reaches zero, the chip enable signal is automatically disabled, preventing the system from being breached through repeated access attempts. This preliminary action transforms the security approach from reactive to proactive.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If a passcode protection scheme is implemented, then unauthorized access is prevented, but the device complexity increases with additional circuitry

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata securityVSAvoidchip enable protection circuit
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent merges the security protection function directly into the existing chip enable circuitry. The counter mechanism and passcode verification logic are integrated with the chip enable signal generation, rather than being separate security modules. The chip enable protection circuit receives the chip enable signal and the counter output, and generates a secured chip enable signal by combining these inputs through logic operations. This merging approach provides robust security while minimizing additional device complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

3Ease of operation

If the memory device remains accessible without strong protection, then ease of operation is maintained, but the device is vulnerable to theft and hacking

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvememory accessVSAvoidunauthorized access
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements a feedback mechanism where the counter continuously monitors access cycles and provides feedback to the chip enable protection circuit. Each access cycle generates feedback that decrements the counter, and when the counter reaches zero, this feedback automatically disables the chip enable signal. This closed-loop feedback system maintains ease of operation for legitimate users while providing strong protection against unauthorized access through repeated attempts.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS10331575B2Secured chip enable with chip disable
Publication Date: 2019.06.25 INTEGRATED SILICON SOLUTION INC
  • US10331575B2 patent drawing
  • US10331575B2 patent drawing
  • US10331575B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A memory device incorporates a chip enable protection circuit implementing a secured chip enable method providing a passcode protected enable scheme with secure chip disable for the memory device. The passcode can be programmed at manufacturing or programmed by the user. Memory device access is enabled by receiving the correct passcode and memory device access is denied when the wrong passcode is entered. Furthermore, the secured chip enable method implements secure chip disable where the memory device is disabled in response to receiving wrong passcodes repeatedly for a maximum number of tries.