Chiplet Die Mutual Authentication to Detect Spy Dies

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing methods struggle to identify and authenticate individual silicon dies in a package to prevent the presence of spy chips during chiplet manufacturing, which poses a risk of hacking and data leaks.

Innovation Solution

A multi-chip architecture with dies configured for mutual authentication using private and public keys, enabling authentication at both the die and package levels through a method that involves generating and verifying authentication certificates among the dies.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If conventional authentication methods are used, then authentication can be performed, but it is difficult to identify spy dies among silicon dies during chiplet manufacturing

Engineering Contradiction:

Improveauthentication reliabilityVSAvoiddifficulty of identifying spy dies

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSDifficulty of detecting and measuring

Solution Approach 1:

The authentication system is segmented into multiple independent authentication units, each die having its own private key and authentication capability. This segmentation allows individual dies to be authenticated independently, enabling the identification of spy dies among legitimate silicon dies during chiplet manufacturing.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

Authentication certificates are generated and stored in each die during the manufacturing process before the dies are packaged into complete semiconductor devices. This preliminary authentication setup enables verification at both the die level before packaging and at the package level after assembly, making it possible to detect spy dies early in the manufacturing process.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #10Preliminary action

2Reliability

If authentication is performed at the package level only, then security is provided, but authentication cannot be performed at the die level before packaging

Engineering Contradiction:

Improvesecurity authenticationVSAvoidauthentication timing flexibility

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The authentication certificate stored in each die serves multiple functions: it enables authentication at the die level before packaging, supports authentication at the package level after assembly, and provides verification capabilities at both individual and collective levels. This multi-functional authentication mechanism provides flexibility in when and how authentication is performed.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

3Object-affected harmful factors

If mutual authentication using private and public keys is implemented among multiple dies, then security against spy chips is enhanced, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:

Improvespy chip resistanceVSAvoidauthentication system complexity

Core Design Contradiction:

Object-affected harmful factorsVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

Authentication certificates act as intermediaries that enable secure verification between dies without requiring complex real-time cryptographic operations between each pair of dies. Each die stores its own private key and the public keys of other dies, allowing mutual authentication through certificate verification. This intermediary approach simplifies the authentication process while maintaining security against spy chips.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS12566837B2Multi-chip for performing chiplet security authentication and method of manufacturing the same

Publication Date: 2026.03.03 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO LTD

AI summary

A method of manufacturing a multi-chip includes generating a first authentication certificate in a first die using a private key of the first die, verifying the first authentication certificate in a second die using a public key of the first die, generating a second authentication certificate in the second die using a private key of the second die, and verifying the second authentication certificate using a public key of the second die in a third die.