Clock Signal Frequency Modulation for Side Channel Attack Defense

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Solution Overview

Problem

Electronic systems are vulnerable to side channel attacks, such as power and EMI analysis, which can reveal secret encryption keys and algorithms, allowing unauthorized access and use.

Innovation Solution

Modulating the clock signal's frequency and pacing during authentication routines using a non-volatile memory register, with parameters like clock stretch duration and pattern, to conceal the actual operation and prevent detection through power or EMI analysis.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If encoding data transfers with secret keys is used, then unauthorized access is prevented, but side channel attacks can still reveal encryption keys through power or EMI monitoring

Engineering Contradiction:

ImprovesecurityVSAvoidside channel attack vulnerability

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements dynamic clock frequency modulation during authentication routines, where the clock frequency is varied according to parameters stored in non-volatile memory. This dynamic behavior changes the timing characteristics of cryptographic operations, making power consumption and EMI patterns unpredictable and thus preventing side channel attacks from reliably extracting encryption keys

Inventive Principle:

Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes operational parameters by loading different clock frequency values and authentication timing parameters from non-volatile memory before executing authentication routines. These parameter changes ensure that each authentication attempt has unique timing characteristics, preventing attackers from using consistent power or EMI analysis to derive secret keys

Inventive Principle:

Principle #35Parameter changes

2Reliability

If clock frequency is modulated to prevent side channel attacks, then security is enhanced, but authentication routine execution time increases

Engineering Contradiction:

ImprovesecurityVSAvoidauthentication execution time

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent pre-loads authentication parameters including clock frequency values into non-volatile memory before the authentication routine executes. This preliminary action ensures that the parameters are readily available during authentication, minimizing any additional access time while still providing the security benefits of parameter variation

Inventive Principle:

Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements periodic re-loading of authentication parameters from non-volatile memory at scheduled intervals or after a threshold number of authentication attempts. This periodic refresh maintains security without requiring full parameter re-initialization for every authentication, thus balancing security enhancement with execution time efficiency

Inventive Principle:

Principle #19Periodic action

Data Source

PatentUS9401802B2Side channel power attack defense with pseudo random clock operation

Publication Date: 2016.07.26 SEMICON COMPONENTS IND LLC

AI summary

Apparatus and methods are provided for defending an electronic circuit secret algorithm and secret parameter values against a side-attack. In an example, a method can include receiving first one or more parameters for altering a clock signal of the electronic device at a non-volatile memory register, and altering a frequency of the clock signal of the electronic device during execution of an authentication routine according to the first one or more parameters.