Cloud-Based Boot Integrity Verification for Storage Platforms
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Solution Overview
Problem
Rootkit attacks, which modify or replace the kernel or bootloader during the boot sequence, are difficult to detect and can grant attackers extensive control over a platform, as they occur before anti-malware programs are loaded, making existing cybersecurity measures ineffective.
Innovation Solution
A storage platform with a secure cryptoprocessor and a boot integrity service that obtains hashes of firmware and software during the boot sequence, compares them with expected values stored on a remote verifier, and limits functionality in response to mismatches, thereby preventing potential damage from rootkit attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If boot integrity verification is performed during the boot sequence, then rootkit attacks can be detected, but the boot process becomes more complex and time-consuming
Solution Approach 1:
The patent performs boot integrity verification during the boot sequence itself, before the operating system and anti-malware programs are loaded. This preliminary action allows detection of rootkit attacks at the earliest possible stage, resolving the contradiction by enabling detection capability while managing complexity through integrated verification rather than adding post-boot security layers
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a secure cryptoprocessor as an intermediary component that independently verifies boot integrity without requiring the main processor or operating system. This mediator approach enables reliable detection while keeping the boot process complexity isolated to a dedicated security subsystem rather than complicating the entire system
2Reliability
If boot integrity verification is performed during the boot sequence, then rootkit attacks can be detected, but the boot process takes longer to complete
Solution Approach 1:
The verification is performed as part of the normal boot sequence flow rather than as a separate post-processing step. By integrating the integrity check into the boot process itself, the patent achieves detection capability without adding significant time overhead, as the verification occurs concurrently with essential boot operations
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses cryptographic hash verification that can quickly compare boot data against stored expected values. This efficient verification method allows the system to rush through the critical verification step without prolonged delays, maintaining acceptable boot times while achieving reliable detection
3Reliability
If remote verification is implemented, then boot integrity can be verified against expected values, but the system requires additional communication infrastructure
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses a remote verifier as an intermediary that stores pre-computed expected hash values and compares them against observed boot data. This mediator approach enhances verification accuracy by using a trusted external reference, while the infrastructure requirement is minimized to simple communication channels for transmitting hash values
Solution Approach 2:
The system copies the essential verification function to a remote location where expected boot values are stored. Rather than requiring complex local verification infrastructure, the patent replicates the reference data remotely and uses simple communication to access it, achieving high verification accuracy with minimal additional infrastructure
4Reliability
If functionality is limited in response to mismatch, then platform security is enhanced, but system availability is reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The patent limits functionality as a preliminary protective measure when boot integrity mismatch is detected. This preemptive action prevents potential rootkit attacks from compromising the system, enhancing security by stopping malicious code execution before it can cause damage, while the availability impact is localized to only the affected compromised functions
Data Source
AI summary
Boot integrity of a storage platform is verified by comparing observed boot data values with expected boot data values stored in a secure remote cloud. The boot data values include hashes of software that runs at each stage of a boot sequence, e.g., BIOS, bootloader, kernel, and runlevel programs. The observed boot data values may be provided by a TPM using an AIK and nonce. If the observed boot data values fail to match the expected boot data values then a boot integrity service running on the storage platform limits functionality such as by disabling IO services, disabling remote data replication, enabling a diagnostic service, enabling a data collection service, disabling access by non-service accounts, and protecting a management database.