Cloud FPGA Deployment with Certificate-Based Dual Roots of Trust
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Solution Overview
Problem
Cloud-based FPGA deployments face security challenges due to remote physical side-channel attacks and potential theft of sensitive hardware designs by malicious actors, leading to concerns over intellectual property confidentiality and integrity.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a tenant-side root of trust (TSRoT) and a cloud FPGA-side root of trust (DecryptStrapper) to authenticate design rule results without compromising design confidentiality, using a bootable image (BI) to manage certificate chains and encrypted bitstreams.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Speed
If cloud-based FPGA deployment is implemented to provide hardware acceleration services, then processing speed and power efficiency are improved, but security vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks and intellectual property theft increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the FPGA deployment process into distinct trust zones: tenant-side root of trust (TSRoT) for design compilation and verification, and cloud FPGA-side root of trust (DecryptStrapper) for bitstream decryption and programming. This segmentation isolates sensitive operations and prevents malicious actors from accessing the entire design flow, thereby maintaining processing speed while reducing security vulnerabilities.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces certificate authorities (CA) and certificate chains as intermediaries to establish trusted communication between tenants and cloud providers. The CA-issued certificates verify the authenticity of both the tenant's design rules and the cloud provider's programming operations, creating a mediator layer that prevents direct exposure of sensitive IP while enabling secure collaboration.
2Reliability
If design rule checking is performed to prevent malicious circuitry, then security is improved, but design confidentiality may be compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by performing design rule checking in a localized, encrypted environment controlled by the tenant's TSRoT. The design rules and checking processes are executed locally with restricted access, ensuring that only authorized components can view the design details. This localized verification maintains security through targeted checking while preserving overall design confidentiality.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements preliminary action by having tenants pre-compile their designs with design rule checks and generate encrypted bitstreams before uploading to the cloud. This preliminary verification ensures that malicious circuitry is detected early in the design phase, allowing security checks to be performed without exposing the final confidential design to the cloud provider.
3Reliability
If certificate validation is implemented to authenticate tenants and cloud providers, then trust is improved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent employs universal certificate chains that serve multiple functions: authenticating tenant identities, verifying design rule integrity, and authorizing cloud provider operations. This multi-functional certificate system consolidates multiple trust verification mechanisms into a single unified framework, improving trust while managing system complexity through standardized cryptographic protocols.
4Loss of information
If encrypted bitstreams are used to protect intellectual property, then confidentiality is improved, but deployment complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements self-service by enabling tenants to autonomously encrypt their own bitstreams using their private keys and the cloud provider's public key infrastructure. This self-encryption process allows tenants to maintain control over their intellectual property without requiring complex centralized encryption management systems, thereby protecting confidentiality while managing deployment complexity through automated cryptographic operations.
Data Source
AI summary
A method and system are directed to protecting a hardware design against confidentiality and integrity attacks, the method comprising providing a bootable image (BI) to a tenant computing entity; receiving a certificate chain originating from the tenant computing entity via the BI; validating the certificate chain with a certificate authority; providing a design rule data object to the tenant computing entity via the BI; receiving an secure design rule result data object and an encrypted bitstream; determining a match of the secure design rule result data object with the design rule data object; and programming a cloud programmable logic instance with a decryption of the encrypted bitstream based at least in part on the match.