Cluster Key Distribution Using Unreadable Coprocessor Storage

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Solution Overview

Problem

Clustered storage systems face security challenges in ensuring that only authorized users can access, modify, or destroy data, necessitating secure handling of data encryption keys.

Innovation Solution

The system employs cryptographic coprocessors to generate and distribute encryption keys during initial cluster formation and updates, storing them in unreadable memory, and uses a key encryption key to encrypt and decrypt data encryption keys, ensuring they are never stored in readable persistent media.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If encryption keys are stored in readable persistent media for easy access, then ease of operation is improved, but security is compromised as unauthorized users can access the keys

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaccess to encryption keysVSAvoidunauthorized access to keys
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the encryption keys from readable persistent media and stores them in coprocessors with protected memory. The keys are taken out of the general storage system and placed in a secure, isolated environment where they cannot be accessed by unauthorized users or processes, while still being available for cryptographic operations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The coprocessor acts as an intermediary between the readable persistent media and the cryptographic operations. It holds the keys in protected memory and provides controlled access for encryption and decryption, preventing direct access to the keys while enabling their functional use.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Productivity

If encryption keys are distributed to all cluster nodes for data access, then productivity is improved, but security is worsened as more nodes have access to the keys

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata access capabilityVSAvoidincreased attack surface
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

Each cluster node extracts and stores its required encryption keys in its own coprocessor with protected memory. This allows each node to have the necessary keys for data access while preventing unauthorized access at each node, as the keys are isolated in secure hardware rather than being accessible system-wide.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The key management is segmented so that each cluster node has its own copy of the necessary keys stored in its own coprocessor. This segmentation allows distributed access to encrypted data while limiting the exposure of keys to individual nodes only, reducing the overall attack surface.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

3Reliability

If keys are updated during cluster membership changes to maintain security, then security is improved, but device complexity increases due to key distribution and synchronization

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata securityVSAvoidkey management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

When a new node joins the cluster, it performs self-service by generating its own copy of the encryption keys and storing them in its coprocessor. The node autonomously configures itself with the necessary security credentials without requiring manual key distribution or complex centralized key management, simplifying the overall system while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS12603759B2Distribution and update of keys
Publication Date: 2026.04.14 NVIDIA CORP
  • US12603759B2 patent drawing
  • US12603759B2 patent drawing
  • US12603759B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Cluster storage systems (100) and methods provide secure generation, distribution, and update of encryption keys (132, 142) during initial cluster formation and cluster membership changes without using readable persistent media. A cryptographic coprocessor (130) stores a key encryption key (132) in write-only memory and uses the unreadable key (132) for encryption and decryption of a data encryption key (142). Methods to securely distribute the initial or updated the key (132) to be stored in the coprocessor (130) and securely update the key (132) when cluster membership changes are provided.