CMP CA Proxy Authentication for Stolen NF Credential Protection
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Solution Overview
Problem
In 5G telecommunications networks, network function (NF) client identity private keys and public key certificates can be stolen and used without authorization to obtain a Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificate, enabling malicious impersonation and unauthorized access.
Innovation Solution
Implement a Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) CA proxy that requires an NRF-issued OAuth 2.0 access token as an additional credential for CMP certificate requests, ensuring multi-factor authentication by validating the NRF registration status and presence of the access token before issuing TLS or Client Credentials Assertion (CCA) certificates.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Extent of automation
If CMP client identity private key and public key certificate are used for certificate management, then automatic certificate management is enabled, but the system becomes vulnerable to theft and unauthorized use of credentials
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a CMP CA proxy as an intermediary component between the NF and the CMP CA. This proxy validates certificate requests by checking NRF registration status and verifying the presence of valid access tokens before forwarding requests to the CMP CA. The intermediary layer adds an additional security check without disrupting the automated certificate management flow, thus resolving the contradiction between automation and security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent segments the certificate management process into distinct validation stages: (1) checking NRF registration status, (2) validating access token presence and validity, and (3) forwarding to CMP CA for certificate issuance. This segmentation allows each stage to perform specific security functions independently, maintaining automation while enhancing security through multiple verification layers.
2Reliability
If multi-factor authentication is implemented by requiring NRF-issued access token, then security against unauthorized access is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements self-service by having the CMP CA proxy automatically perform validation checks without requiring manual intervention. The proxy autonomously checks NRF registration status, validates access tokens, and makes decisions about certificate issuance. This automation maintains the simplicity of the user experience while implementing complex security measures in the background.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent merges multiple security functions (NRF registration checking, access token validation, and CMP CA communication) into a single integrated CMP CA proxy component. This consolidation handles the complexity internally while presenting a simple interface to both the NF and the CMP CA, thus improving security without significantly increasing observable system complexity.
Data Source
AI summary
A method for protecting against unauthorized use of CMP client identity private keys and CMP public key certificates associated with NFs includes receiving, by a CMP CA proxy, a first CMP certificate request for renewing a security certificate associated with a first NF, the CMP certificate request including a public key certificate associated with the first NF and is protected by a CMP client identity private key associated with the first NF. The method further includes determining that the first NF is registered with the NRF, and, in response to determining that the first NF is registered with the NRF, checking, by the CMP CA proxy whether the first CMP certificate request includes an NRF-issued access token for the first NF, determining that the CMP certificate request does not include the NRF-issued access token for the first NF, and, in response to determining that the first CMP certificate request does not include the NRF-issued access token for the first NF, performing a network security action regarding the first CMP certificate request.