Code Transparency Service for Third-Party Application Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

In confidential computing environments, especially in cloud settings, there is a risk that third-party code may violate the integrity and confidentiality without being detected, as the integrity and confidentiality provided by confidential computing could be compromised by unknown backdoors in third-party code.

Innovation Solution

A Code Transparency Service (CTS) instance is used to verify third-party applications by checking their compliance with policies through a trusted execution environment (TEE), ensuring that only authorized code is trusted and auditable, and generating a ledger countersignature upon successful verification, allowing users to trust third-party code without compromising the confidentiality of the computing environment.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If third-party code is used in confidential computing environments, then functionality and versatility are improved, but security and reliability deteriorate due to potential backdoors and integrity violations

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveability to use third-party codeVSAvoidintegrity and confidentiality security
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a code transparency service as an intermediary between third-party code and the confidential computing environment. This service verifies code integrity through cryptographic measurements and policy checks before allowing execution, and provides continuous monitoring mechanisms. The intermediary resolves the contradiction by enabling third-party code usage while maintaining security through verification and monitoring layers.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If code verification and monitoring mechanisms are implemented, then security and reliability are improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecode integrity verificationVSAvoidverification system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements self-service mechanisms where the code transparency service automatically performs verification, monitoring, and enforcement actions without requiring manual intervention. The system autonomously checks code integrity, validates policies, and responds to violations, reducing operational complexity while maintaining high reliability through automated security processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Difficulty of detecting and measuring

If comprehensive code monitoring is performed, then detection capability is improved, but processing overhead and time consumption increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvebackdoor detection capabilityVSAvoidcode verification time
Core Design Contradiction:
Difficulty of detecting and measuringVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent performs preliminary verification actions by establishing cryptographic baselines and policy rules before code execution. Code integrity measurements are taken and verified in advance, and policies are pre-configured for automated enforcement. This preliminary action reduces real-time monitoring overhead while maintaining comprehensive detection capability through pre-established verification frameworks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS12190316B2Code transparency system operation
Publication Date: 2025.01.07 MICROSOFT TECHNOLOGY LICENSING LLC
  • US12190316B2 patent drawing
  • US12190316B2 patent drawing
  • US12190316B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The disclosed technology is generally directed to code transparency. In one example of the technology, a claim associated with an application is received. The claim is a document that is signed with a claim signature and that includes evidence associated with a policy, and further includes an expected set of at least one binary measurement associated with the application. The evidence is cryptographically verifiable evidence associated with the application. A trusted execution environment (TEE) is used to provide a distributed ledger. The claim is verified. Verifying the claim includes verifying the expected set of at least one binary measurement associated with the application, verifying the claim signature, and, based at least on the evidence, verifying that the application meets the policy. Upon successful verification of the claim, the claim is appended to the distributed ledger. A ledger countersignature associated with the claim is generated.