Combinatorial Auction Bidding Language for Winner Determination

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Solution Overview

Problem

Winner determination in combinatorial auctions is NP-hard, making current methods inefficient for auctions involving numerous goods and bids, as they struggle to maximize seller revenue effectively.

Innovation Solution

A method utilizing stochastic local search techniques with Boolean operators to allocate goods among bids, constructing neighboring allocations and comparing values to find high-quality allocations, potentially optimizing revenue through logical connectives in bids.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If traditional winner determination methods are used in combinatorial auctions, then the allocation can be computed, but the computational time becomes excessively long for large-scale auctions

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvewinner determination speedVSAvoidcomputational time
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements a dynamic allocation process that evolves through iterative reallocation cycles. The system starts with an initial allocation and repeatedly constructs neighboring allocations by reallocating goods between bids, accepting improvements when found. This dynamic search process adapts to the specific bid structure and converges on high-quality allocations efficiently, transforming the static NP-hard optimization into an iterative improvement process that scales well.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The patent employs partial action by focusing the search on neighboring allocations that differ from the current allocation by small amounts (single good reallocations) rather than exhaustively searching all possible allocations. This partial exploration of the solution space is sufficient to find high-quality allocations without requiring complete enumeration, dramatically reducing computational time while maintaining solution quality.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

2Measurement precision

If complex bidding requirements with multiple bids are submitted to reflect complements, then the bidding accuracy improves, but the complexity of winner determination increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvebidding requirement accuracyVSAvoidwinner determination complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the complex bidding requirements into atomic units by representing each bid as a set of goods with associated Boolean operators. This segmentation allows the system to handle complex requirements systematically by processing individual bid components and their logical relationships, making the overall complex problem manageable through structured decomposition.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements feedback mechanisms where the system evaluates the value of neighboring allocations and uses this information to guide the search process. By comparing the values of current and neighboring allocations and accepting improvements, the system adapts its search strategy based on the specific structure of the bids, efficiently navigating through complex bidding requirements to find optimal solutions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS7475035B2Bidding language for combinatorial auctions and method of use thereof
Publication Date: 2009.01.06 JAGGAER LLC
  • US7475035B2 patent drawing
  • US7475035B2 patent drawing
  • US7475035B2 patent drawing

AI summary

In a combinatorial auction, a plurality of bids is received each having a plurality of sub bids and Boolean operators logically connecting each pair of sub bids. A current allocation is determined by allocating goods to at least one of the bids and a best allocation is initialized with the current allocation. A neighboring allocation is constructed by reallocating within the current allocation at least one good from at least one bid to another bid. The best allocation is updated with the neighboring allocation when the value of the neighboring allocation is greater than the current value of the best allocation.