Command Injection Detection with Input and Execution Hooks
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for detecting command injection attacks suffer from high false positive rates, making them impractical due to user disregard or disabling, and struggle to differentiate between benign software operations and malicious code injection attempts.
Innovation Solution
A two-layered approach involving an input hook and execution hook to detect and block command injection attacks, utilizing time-based correlation and a blacklist to reduce false positives, and identifying executable products and command separators.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing detection methods are used to identify command injection attacks, then attack detection capability is provided, but false positive rate increases making the system impractical
Solution Approach 1:
The detection system is divided into two independent hook functions: an input hook that analyzes potential inputs for command separators and executable products, and an execution hook that analyzes execution commands. This segmentation allows each hook to specialize in specific detection tasks, improving overall detection accuracy while reducing false positives through targeted analysis at different stages of the command processing pipeline.
Solution Approach 2:
The input hook performs preliminary analysis of potential inputs before execution occurs. By identifying and recording suspicious inputs containing command separators and executable products in advance, the system can prepare detection data structurally organized by executable product, enabling faster and more accurate verification during the execution phase without redundant analysis.
2Adaptability or versatility
If detection sensitivity is increased to catch more attacks, then detection coverage improves, but false positives increase causing user disregard or disabling
Solution Approach 1:
The system dynamically adjusts detection behavior based on the execution context. The execution hook verifies suspicious inputs only when actual execution commands match the recorded patterns, adapting the detection intensity to the specific situation. This dynamic approach maintains high detection coverage for genuine threats while avoiding false alarms in benign contexts, preserving user acceptance.
3Reliability
If comprehensive input analysis is performed to identify all potential threats, then detection thoroughness improves, but processing time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The input hook performs comprehensive analysis of potential inputs in advance, structurally organizing suspicious inputs by executable product before execution occurs. This preliminary action ensures thorough detection coverage is achieved during the input phase, allowing the execution phase to rely on pre-organized data structures rather than performing redundant comprehensive analysis, thereby reducing processing time during critical execution windows.
Solution Approach 2:
The system creates copies of suspicious input patterns and stores them in a structured format organized by executable product. Instead of re-analyzing original inputs during execution, the system works with these pre-prepared copies, maintaining detection thoroughness while significantly reducing the computational overhead during the time-critical execution phase.
Data Source
AI summary
A system, a method, and a computer program product for identification of command injection attacks. The system comprises processors, devices connected to a network, a memory, and an execution platform connected to the devices via the network and capable of executing executable products of execution commands provided thereto by the devices. At least one of the processors is configured to analyze execution commands provided to the execution platform to identify input provisioning or execution events, and determine whether they correlate to the suspicious record event, to perform a remedial action prior to attempting to execute them. When determining that the input includes a command separator and an executable product, the processor records a suspicious event. In response to identifying a potential execution event, determine that an execution command configured to be executed thereby correlates to the suspicious event, and flag the execution command as a command injection attack.