Communication Device Fraud Circuit Detection via Timing Analysis
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing communication devices in vehicle-mounted transceivers and mobile transceivers are vulnerable to fraudulent circuits inserted into the wiring between the communication and encryption/decryption circuits, allowing malicious operations such as eavesdropping and signal rewriting, which can lead to unauthorized vehicle access and theft.
Innovation Solution
A communication device with a communication control unit and an encryption unit connected via wiring, where the communication control unit generates and transmits a predetermined signal, measures the duration for encryption and return, and determines if a fraudulent circuit is present by comparing the actual duration to a target duration, thereby detecting unauthorized interference.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of manufacture
If the communication control unit and encryption unit are connected through wiring, then the device complexity is reduced and ease of manufacture is improved, but the system becomes vulnerable to fraudulent circuit insertion allowing eavesdropping and signal rewriting
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a measurement unit as an intermediary component between the communication control unit and encryption unit. This measurement unit monitors the time required for signal transmission and encryption operations, serving as a mediator that detects abnormal delays caused by fraudulent circuit insertion without disrupting the normal wiring connection between communication and encryption units.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements a feedback mechanism where the measurement unit continuously monitors encryption operation timing and provides feedback to the communication control unit. When the measured time exceeds the predetermined threshold, the system receives feedback indicating potential fraudulent circuit insertion, enabling real-time security detection while maintaining the simple wired connection structure.
2Object-generated harmful factors
If a fraudulent circuit is inserted into the wiring to perform illegal operations, then the ability to eavesdrop and rewrite signals is improved, but the communication time increases due to the additional processing delay
Solution Approach 1:
The patent establishes predetermined time thresholds for encryption operations before actual communication occurs. The measurement unit is pre-configured with expected time ranges for normal encryption operations, enabling the system to proactively detect fraudulent circuits by comparing actual operation times against these pre-established benchmarks.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces physical security measures (such as secure hardware enclosures or tamper-proof wiring) with a timing-based detection mechanism. Instead of relying on mechanical protection against circuit insertion, the system uses temporal measurement and comparison to detect the presence of fraudulent circuits, substituting physical security with a functional detection approach.
Data Source
AI summary
A communication device includes a communication control unit generating a communication signal to be transmitted to an external source and an encryption unit connected to the communication control unit through a wiring. The communication control unit stores a predetermined communication signal indicative of a predetermined message and a target duration required for from a transmission of the predetermined communication signal to a reception of the same from the encryption unit. The communication control unit further counts an actual duration taken from the transmission of the predetermined communication signal to the reception of the same from the encryption unit. When the actual duration is longer than the target duration, the communication control unit determines that a fraudulent circuit is inserted into the wiring for fraudulently acting on the communication signal.


