Composite Resource Document Digital Signature Validation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing digital signature technologies face challenges in securely signing and validating composite resource documents, as they often require the entire document to be signed as a single entity, leading to invalidation when modifications are made post-signature, and lack efficient resource-level subtraction filtering.
Innovation Solution
The solution involves generating a signature hash token using a selected list of resources from a composite resource document, encrypting it with a secret key, and validating the signature by comparing it with a decrypted hash token, allowing for resource-level subtraction filtering and secure modification of documents without invalidating the signature.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the entire composite resource document is signed as a single entity, then the digital signature provides comprehensive security coverage, but any modification to any resource invalidates the signature
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the composite resource document into individual resources and creates a manifest that lists these resources. The digital signature is applied selectively to specific resources identified in the manifest, rather than treating the entire document as a single entity. This allows modifications to unsigned resources without invalidating the signature.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies different security treatments to different resources within the composite document. Resources can be individually identified in the manifest and selectively signed based on their importance and modification requirements. This local differentiation allows critical resources to maintain signature validity while permitting modifications to non-critical resources.
2Adaptability or versatility
If selective resource signing is implemented, then document flexibility and modification capability improve, but signature validation complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent pre-generates a manifest that contains the complete list of resources and their identifiers before the signing process. This manifest serves as a roadmap that guides the signature validation process, eliminating the need for complex runtime analysis of which resources should be signed. The validation process simply needs to verify the signature against the resources listed in the pre-generated manifest.
3Productivity
If resource-level subtraction filtering is implemented, then performance and security are enhanced by signing only necessary resources, but the mechanism for identifying and filtering resources becomes more complex
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the resource identification process into two clear steps: first, generate a complete list of all resources in the manifest; second, identify and subtract resources that should not be signed. This segmentation simplifies the filtering mechanism by providing a systematic approach rather than requiring complex exclusion logic.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts and identifies specific resources from the complete manifest that should be excluded from signing. By explicitly identifying these resources for subtraction, the system achieves efficient selective signing without requiring complex filtering rules, as the exclusion list is directly derived from the manifest structure.
Data Source
AI summary
An embodiment of the disclosure can receive a composite resource document containing at least one resource. An updated manifest resource can be obtained. The updated manifest resource can list all resources in the composite resource document. A set of zero or more (0 . . . N) resources can be indicated. Each indicated resource is one that is to be subtracted from the list of resources in the updated manifest resource in order to create a generated signature reference list of identified resources to be signed. A hash token can be generated using the resources identified in the generated signature reference list to form a signature hash token. The signature hash token can be encrypted with a secret key.