Computer Secure Boot Failure Through Tamper-Triggered Byte Deletion

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing computer systems fail to effectively fail a secure boot when a case tampering event occurs during power off, leaving data vulnerable to unauthorized access.

Innovation Solution

A computer system comprising a microcontroller unit (MCU), a trusted platform module (TPM) for generating random bytes, a bootloader for storing these bytes, and sensors to detect tampering events, which trigger deletion of the bytes via power supply when a tampering event is detected, ensuring secure boot failure.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If the computer system stores random bytes in the MCU and hardware for secure boot, then the secure boot functionality is improved, but the system becomes vulnerable to tampering when powered off

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecure boot functionalityVSAvoidvulnerability to tampering
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary actions by detecting tampering events before the secure boot process completes. Sensors monitor for case opening or modification attempts, and if detected, the system proactively deletes the random bytes from MCU and hardware storage before the boot process can utilize them, preventing unauthorized access altogether

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The invention converts the potential harm of stored random bytes (security vulnerability) into a benefit by using the same storage mechanism as a security feature. The random bytes serve dual purposes: enabling secure boot when intact, and acting as a security trigger - when their storage location shows signs of tampering, their deletion becomes the security mechanism that protects the system

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

2Object-affected harmful factors

If the system deletes random bytes upon tampering detection, then security is improved, but the secure boot process may fail even without actual security compromise

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity protectionVSAvoidsecure boot success rate
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system implements feedback through sensors that continuously monitor the physical state of the device case and hardware components. This feedback loop provides real-time information about tampering attempts, allowing the system to make informed decisions about whether to delete random bytes. The feedback mechanism ensures that only actual tampering events trigger deletion, not normal operational variations

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The invention introduces sensors as intermediary components between the physical tampering event and the logical secure boot process. These sensors act as mediators that detect physical changes and translate them into signals that trigger the appropriate security response, providing a buffer that prevents false positives while maintaining security

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Difficulty of detecting and measuring

If sensors continuously monitor for tampering events, then detection capability is improved, but power consumption increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetampering detection capabilityVSAvoidpower consumption
Core Design Contradiction:
Difficulty of detecting and measuringVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The monitoring system employs periodic action by having sensors check for tampering events at specific intervals or at critical transition points in the power-on sequence, rather than continuously monitoring at full power. This approach maintains detection capability while significantly reducing average power consumption compared to continuous high-power monitoring

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

Solution Approach 2:

The system applies self-service by designing sensors that can detect tampering events passively or with minimal power activation. The monitoring mechanism serves itself by using the presence or absence of tampering indicators (such as case position, seal integrity) that can be detected without active power-intensive scanning, reducing the energy burden on the system

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS12373563B2Computer system for failing a secure boot in a case tampering event
Publication Date: 2025.07.29 MOXA INC
  • US12373563B2 patent drawing
  • US12373563B2 patent drawing
  • US12373563B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A computer system for failing a secure boot in a case tampering event comprises a microcontroller unit (MCU); a trusted platform module (TPM), for generating random bytes for a secure boot of the computer system; a bootloader, for storing information comprising the random bytes in the MCU and at least one hardware of the computer system and performing the secure boot, wherein the TPM is comprised in the bootloader; an operating system (OS), for performing the secure boot; and at least one sensor, coupled to the MCU, for detecting a case tampering event, and transmitting a signal for triggering a deletion of the random bytes, if the case tampering event happens. The MCU performs the operation of deleting the random bytes stored in the MCU and the at least one hardware according to a power supply, in response to the signal.