Connection Agent Verification via Public-Key Cryptography
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Solution Overview
Problem
In desktop and application virtualization environments, the lack of a trusted brokering authority poses challenges in verifying whether a connection agent is clean or tainted by previously logged-in users, especially during server outages, which can compromise security and user data.
Innovation Solution
A method involving public-key cryptography is implemented, where connection agents and servers generate key pairs, with the server signing the connection agent's public key upon verification of its untainted state, allowing secure registration and data signing, and enabling clients to verify the connection agent's integrity without relying on a trusted central authority.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a trusted brokering authority is used to verify connection agent cleanliness, then verification reliability is improved, but system complexity increases and the system becomes vulnerable to server outages
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the trust verification mechanism from the centralized brokering authority and embeds it directly in the connection agent through cryptographic signatures. The connection agent independently verifies its own cleanliness status by checking signatures on its public key, eliminating the need for continuous external verification and reducing system complexity while maintaining reliability.
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary verification by signing the connection agent's public key before the agent serves any users. This advance signing action ensures that when the agent later connects to users, it already has proven cleanliness status embedded in its cryptographic credentials, eliminating the need for real-time brokering authority involvement and making the system resilient to server outages.
2Reliability
If public-key cryptography is implemented for verification, then security is improved, but computational overhead increases
Solution Approach 1:
The computationally intensive signing operation is performed once in advance when the connection agent is provisioned or cleaned, rather than being repeated for every user connection. The signed public key serves as a reusable credential that proves cleanliness status without requiring repeated cryptographic computations, significantly reducing ongoing computational overhead while maintaining strong security.
3Reliability
If connection agents are reimaged when tainted, then system security is improved, but service continuity may be disrupted
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements feedback through the cryptographic signature mechanism that continuously validates connection agent cleanliness. When a connection agent becomes tainted, the signature verification fails, providing immediate feedback that triggers reimaging. This automated feedback loop ensures security is maintained while minimizing manual intervention and service disruption, as the system self-detects and responds to contamination events.
Data Source
AI summary
Methods and systems for tracking tainted connection agents, such as without a trusted central authority, are described herein. During a server outage, a client device may verify that a connection agent is untainted based on a public-key encryption or certificate-based system. If the connection agent is untainted, a server may sign a public key or certificate associated with the connection agent. The server may provide, to the client device, a lease, a public key associated with the server. The connection agent may sign data generated by the client device. The client device may verify a signature of the signed public key, such as based on the public key associated with the server. The client device may verify a signature of the signed data, such as based on the verified public key associated with the connection agent.