Container-to-Memory Authentication Using Process-Derived Keys
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing virtualized computing architectures face complexity and inefficiency due to hypervisor-managed public/private key pair generation for secure memory access, requiring frequent updates and central authentication management.
Innovation Solution
Implementing cryptographic key-based authentication within memory to generate secure process unique secret keys, allowing direct authentication between processes/containers and non-volatile memory, reducing hypervisor involvement and enhancing security through distributed key management.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the hypervisor manages public/private key pair generation for secure memory access, then centralized authentication control is achieved, but hypervisor complexity increases and frequent updates are required
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the key pair generation and authentication functionality from the hypervisor and relocates it to the secure enclave. The secure enclave now independently generates its own key pairs and manages authentication with non-volatile memory, removing the burden of key management from the hypervisor while maintaining centralized security control within the enclave boundary.
Solution Approach 2:
The system segments authentication responsibilities by creating distinct security domains: the secure enclave handles key generation and authentication logic, the non-volatile memory stores encrypted data, and the hypervisor focuses on resource management. This segmentation allows each component to specialize in its function without unnecessary complexity.
2Adaptability or versatility
If the hypervisor manages all authentication for containers, then centralized security policy enforcement is achieved, but the system requires more frequent updates to accommodate different authentication rules
Solution Approach 1:
Each secure enclave instance now autonomously generates its own key pairs and manages its own authentication credentials without requiring hypervisor intervention for key management. The enclave self-adapts to different authentication requirements by generating unique cryptographic identities, eliminating the need for hypervisor updates to accommodate different authentication rules.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the parameter of authentication management from centralized hypervisor control to distributed enclave autonomy. Each enclave can independently adjust its cryptographic parameters and authentication methods without requiring system-wide updates, enabling flexible adaptation to different security requirements.
3Reliability
If direct authentication between containers and non-volatile memory is implemented, then security is enhanced through distributed key management, but hypervisor involvement in security operations is reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The secure enclave acts as an intermediary between containers and non-volatile memory, handling all cryptographic operations and authentication protocols. This intermediary role enhances security by isolating sensitive key management operations within the trusted enclave boundary while reducing hypervisor involvement to simple resource allocation and container management tasks.
Data Source
AI summary
An exemplary system includes a computing device configured to host a hypervisor. The hypervisor is configured to create a first container configured to host a first application and is allocated a first location of the plurality of locations of the memory and a second container configured to host a second application and is allocated a second location of the plurality of locations of the memory. During boot of the first container, the first container is configured to generate a cryptographic key that is based on a measurement or characteristic of process code of the first container, a configuration parameter of the first container, or any combination thereof. During boot of the second container, the second container is configured to generate a cryptographic key that is based on a measurement or characteristic of process code of the second container, a configuration parameter of the second container, or any combination thereof.


