Control Application Privilege Isolation via IPC Components
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Solution Overview
Problem
Industrial automation systems face challenges in managing and securing control applications that require extensive security authorizations, leading to unclear privilege use, complex access management, and potential misuse, which complicates compliance with device security policies.
Innovation Solution
The method involves using process control components, such as software containers, with additional sequence control components to manage and control access to safety-critical resources through interprocess communication, ensuring transparent and needs-based privilege granting by creating specifications and adhering to device-specific security policies.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If control applications are granted extensive security authorizations to access safety-critical resources, then their functionality and access capability are improved, but the risk of misuse and complexity of access management increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the control application into two distinct components: the control flow component (CFC) that executes control logic and the additional control component (ACC) that manages security authorizations. This segmentation allows the CFC to access safety-critical resources through controlled interfaces in the ACC, reducing access management complexity while maintaining functionality. The ACC acts as a gateway that mediates all resource access requests, implementing security policies without requiring the CFC to have direct extensive authorizations.
Solution Approach 2:
The additional control component (ACC) serves as an intermediary between the control flow component and safety-critical resources. The ACC holds the extensive security authorizations and grants controlled access to the CFC through defined interfaces. This intermediary approach allows the system to maintain high access capability while reducing the complexity of managing security policies, as all authorization decisions are centralized in the ACC rather than distributed across multiple control applications.
2Productivity
If control applications use elevated privileges for security-critical operations, then their operational effectiveness is improved, but the risk of security breaches and compliance violations increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements local quality by creating distinct security contexts within the control application architecture. The additional control component (ACC) operates with elevated privileges for specific security-critical operations, while the control flow component (CFC) operates with restricted privileges for general control logic. This localized privilege assignment allows operational effectiveness in security-critical functions while minimizing security breach risk in other areas. Each component has precisely the privileges it needs for its specific function, reducing the attack surface.
Solution Approach 2:
The system applies preliminary anti-action by establishing security policies and authorization checks before control applications can access safety-critical resources. The ACC pre-configures access controls and monitors resource access patterns, preventing potential security breaches before they occur. Security validations are performed in advance of actual resource access, ensuring that even if the CFC has extensive functional requirements, it cannot execute harmful operations without proper authorization.
3Use of energy by moving object
If multiple control applications share a common execution environment, then resource utilization is improved, but the risk of interference and security conflicts increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a new dimensional layer of abstraction by implementing the additional control component (ACC) architecture. Instead of relying solely on traditional process isolation mechanisms, the system adds a component-level isolation dimension where each CFC has its own dedicated ACC. This dimensional change allows multiple control applications to share the underlying execution environment and resources efficiently while maintaining security isolation through the ACC boundary layer, which mediates all cross-application resource access.
Data Source
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AI summary
In order to provide control applications by means of sequence control components, in the case of control applications of which the execution demands selected privileges, a specification (212, 222) of required safety-critical resources (101-103) is established in each case. On the basis of the specifications, an additional sequence control component (132), which is provided for providing access to the required safety-critical resources, is determined in each case. Accordingly, execution of the respective sequence control component together with the additional sequence control component is started. By way of a sequence control environment, an interface (130) for interprocess communication between the respective sequence control component and the additional sequence control component is set up. The access to the respectively required safety-critical resources is provided by means of interprocess communication between the respective sequence control component and the additional sequence control component.