Control System Cryptographic Identity Management with Offline Keys
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing cryptographic systems face security concerns due to central storage of private keys, which can lead to widespread breaches if the central authority is compromised, and challenges in effectively revoking compromised or invalidated private keys.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a system where private keys are generated offline during a setup phase for entities in a non-operational mode, using identity-based encryption schemes, and maintaining a database of online identity statuses through an identity revocation server to manage key revocation and ensure secure cryptographic operations.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If private keys are stored centrally by a trusted authority, then key management is simplified, but security is compromised because the central authority becomes a single point of failure
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments key management into two independent parts: (1) a trusted authority that only generates and distributes public keys, and (2) individual entities that independently generate and manage their own private keys. This segmentation eliminates the single point of failure while maintaining simplified key management through the trusted authority's public key distribution function.
Solution Approach 2:
The invention extracts the private key generation function from the trusted authority and assigns it to individual entities. Each entity uses its own secure random number generator to create private keys locally, removing the vulnerability of central storage while preserving the trusted authority's role in public key distribution and verification.
2Adaptability or versatility
If private keys are stored centrally, then revocation can be implemented, but the system becomes vulnerable to widespread breaches if the central authority is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the key management functions so that private keys are never stored centrally. Each entity maintains its private key locally, eliminating the security breach risk associated with central storage while preserving revocation capability through the trusted authority's ability to issue new public keys and invalidate old ones.
Solution Approach 2:
The trusted authority preliminarily distributes public keys to entities before any cryptographic operations occur. When revocation is needed, the authority can immediately issue new public keys and notify relevant parties, enabling rapid response to security incidents without compromising stored private keys.
3Productivity
If private keys are generated online during operational mode, then key updates can occur dynamically, but security risk increases due to potential exposure during transmission
Solution Approach 1:
The invention extracts the private key generation process from the online operational environment and performs it locally at each entity using secure random number generators. This eliminates the security risk of transmitting private keys over networks while maintaining dynamic key update capability through the trusted authority's public key distribution.
Solution Approach 2:
Each entity independently generates its own private keys using local secure random number generators during the setup phase. This self-service approach eliminates dependency on online key distribution and removes the exposure risk associated with transmitting sensitive cryptographic material over networks.
4Reliability
If a comprehensive revocation system is implemented, then key security is improved, but system complexity increases due to verification and scalability challenges
Solution Approach 1:
The invention extracts the private key storage function from the trusted authority, eliminating the need for complex verification systems to protect centrally stored keys. The revocation process is simplified to public key distribution and invalidation notifications, reducing system complexity while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
Instead of the trusted authority managing and protecting private keys (which requires complex security infrastructure), the system inverts the approach by having entities manage their own private keys locally. The trusted authority only manages public keys, dramatically simplifying the revocation and verification processes.
Data Source
AI summary
Cryptographic identity management in an industrial control system. During a setup phase, a public key is defined and a private key is generated for a first entity while the first entity is in the non-operational mode. During an operational mode of the first entity, a second entity that is in a non-operational mode is identified. A public key is defined and a private key is generated for the second entity while the second entity is in the non-operational mode. Responsive to a request, an online identity status is transmitted to an entity (e.g., first or second entity), while the entity is in the operational mode. In this manner, the entity may be configured to use the online identity status to perform an encryption and/or a signature operation.


