Control Signal Integrity Checking in Functional Safety

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing methods for checking address and control signal integrity in high-reliability and functional safety applications are costly and inefficient, particularly in devices lacking dedicated hardware for these functions.

Innovation Solution

A method and device for checking the integrity of control signals with minimal hardware area and computational overhead, involving the generation of first control information based on original control information, obtaining original checking information, and determining the correctness of the first control information, which can be implemented in a processor and memory system to ensure accurate data access and operation execution.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If traditional data validation methods are used to check address and control signal integrity, then reliability is improved, but device complexity and hardware cost increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaddress and control signal integrityVSAvoidhardware area and computational overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system uses existing control information already present in the data bus to perform self-validation of address and control signals. The control information contains embedded validation data that enables the system to check its own integrity without external assistance or additional validation hardware.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Solution Approach 2:

The control information serves multiple functions simultaneously: it controls the memory access operation and contains embedded validation information for integrity checking. This multi-functionality eliminates the need for separate validation signals or additional hardware components.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

2Reliability

If dedicated hardware for address and control signal checking is added, then functional safety is improved, but manufacturing cost increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvefunctional safetyVSAvoidmanufacturing cost and hardware area
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of manufacture

Solution Approach 1:

The system achieves functional safety through self-validation using existing control information. No dedicated safety hardware is required because the control information itself contains the means for validation, making the system self-sufficient for safety-critical checking.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Solution Approach 2:

The control information is modified to include embedded validation parameters while maintaining its original control function. This parameter enhancement allows validation capability to be added without requiring completely new hardware structures.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Measurement precision

If comprehensive data validation is performed on all control signals, then measurement precision is improved, but productivity decreases due to computational overhead

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecontrol signal validation accuracyVSAvoidcomputational overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The validation process uses the control information already present in the system without requiring additional computational resources. The embedded validation data enables precise checking while maintaining normal system performance because no extra computation is needed beyond using the existing control signals.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS10911181B2Method for checking address and control signal integrity in functional safety applications, related products
Publication Date: 2021.02.02 HANGZHOU FABU TECH CO LTD
  • US10911181B2 patent drawing
  • US10911181B2 patent drawing
  • US10911181B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The present disclosure provides a method for checking a to-be-checked signal and related products. The method is applied in a checking device and includes: a first obtaining module, configured to obtain a to-be-checked signal carrying first control information, wherein the first control information is generated based on original control information; a second obtaining module, configured to obtain original checking information; a determining module, configured to determine the first control information according to the to-be-checked signal; and a checking module, configured to check correctness of the first control information according to the original checking information. The present disclosure can be used to enable reliability and functional safety on devices originally designed without features intended to support those functions.