Core Network Signaling for System Information Authentication

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Solution Overview

Problem

Wireless communication systems face vulnerabilities as system information (SI) transmitted from base stations to user equipment (UE) is unencrypted, making it susceptible to denial of service (DoS) attacks where attackers can provide false information, compromising connection establishment.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a method where private key-public key pairs are stored at a network node in the core network, allowing UE to verify the signature of SI messages using provisioned public keys, ensuring authenticity of SI messages by generating and transmitting signatures based on these keys.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If system information is transmitted unencrypted from base station to UE, then transmission simplicity is maintained, but security against DoS attacks deteriorates

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetransmission simplicityVSAvoidsecurity against DoS attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

A core network node is introduced as an intermediary to generate and provide signatures for system information messages. The base station transmits SI messages with signatures from the core network node, and the UE verifies these signatures using public keys also provided by the core network node. This intermediary approach maintains transmission simplicity while adding security verification capability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If digital signatures are added to SI messages for verification, then security against false base station attacks is improved, but message complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against false base station attacksVSAvoidmessage complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The core network node acts as a trusted intermediary that generates signatures and provides both signatures and public keys to the UE. This separates the complexity of key management from the base station and UE, allowing them to focus on their primary functions while maintaining security through the intermediary's cryptographic operations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

Public keys are provided to the UE in advance through the core network node before the UE needs to verify SI messages. This preliminary provision of verification materials simplifies the verification process during actual SI message reception, as the UE already has the necessary public keys stored and ready for immediate verification without additional real-time complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Reliability

If public keys are provisioned to UE for signature verification, then authentication capability is improved, but key management complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication capabilityVSAvoidkey management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The core network node serves as a centralized intermediary for key management, generating private-public key pairs and securely distributing public keys to UEs. This centralized approach consolidates key management complexity in the core network node, allowing base stations and UEs to operate with simpler key handling procedures while maintaining strong authentication capability through the intermediary's coordinated key distribution.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS12160518B2System information protection at a network function in the core network
Publication Date: 2024.12.03 QUALCOMM INC
  • US12160518B2 patent drawing
  • US12160518B2 patent drawing
  • US12160518B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. Private keys may be maintained upstream in a network at a more secure location. For example, when a signature is needed, a base station may transmit a signing request to a signing function within the core network and may transmit system information (SI) to be protected. The signing function may use a private key to generate a signature for the SI and returns the signature to the base station. The base station may transmit the SI and the signature to user equipment (UEs) within a coverage area of the base station. The UEs may obtain a public key corresponding to the private key and may use the public key to verify that the signature for the SI is valid and from the base station. The public key, and hence the signature, may correspond to a particular tracking area.